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John Page 
THE WORLD BANK 
The East Asian Miracle: 
Four Lessons 
for Development Policy 
Since the study of economic development began in earnest at the close 
of the Second World War, academics and policymakers have debated 
the appropriate role of public policy in developing economies. East Asia 
has a remarkable record of high and sustained economic growth. From 
1965 to 1990 its 23 economies grew faster than those of all other regions. 
Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly miraculous growth 
in just eight high performing Asian economies (HPAEs)-Japan; the 
"four tigers": Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan; and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of South- 
east Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.1 The East Asian economies 
provide a range of policy frameworks-extending from Hong Kong's 
nearly complete laissez faire to the highly selective policy regimes of 
Japan and Korea. The coexistence of activist public policies and rapid 
Presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Ninth Conference on Macroeco- 
nomics. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the author. They do not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. 
1. These eight HPAEs are the subject of the World Bank's recently completed study, The 
East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, on which this essay draws 
extensively. The East Asian Miracle report is the product of a World Bank research team 
led by John Page and comprising Nancy Birdsall, Ed Campos, W. Max Corden, 
Chang-Shik Kim, Howard Pack, Richard Sabot, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Marilou Uy. 
William Easterly, Robert Z. Lawrence, Peter Petri, and Lant Pritchett made major 
contributions. Lawrence MacDonald was the principal editor. Background papers are 
available from the Policy Research Department, The World Bank. The findings, inter- 
pretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. 
They do not represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent. 
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growth in some of the East Asian economies-especially Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan-has raised complex and controversial ques- 
tions concerning the relationship between government, the private 
sector, and the market. 
This essay looks at four public policy lessons of the East Asian 
miracle. Section 1 argues that the eight HPAEs can be grouped together 
and distinguished from other low- and middle-income countries on the 
basis of their rapid, sustained, and shared growth. Section 2 examines 
the controversy over the sources of growth in the HPAEs and presents 
evidence on the relative roles of accumulation and total factor produc- 
tivity (TFP) change. Section 3 discusses two aspects of public policy in 
East Asia that conform to the conventional wisdom concerning good 
development policy-macroeconomic management and broad-based 
educational policies. Section 4 examines two more controversial issues 
-the significance of the HPAEs' export push strategies and industrial 
policies for TFP change. It concludes that export orientation rather than 
selective intervention played the dominant role in increasing economy- 
wide TFP growth rates. 
1. The Nature of the Miracle-Rapid Growth 
with Equity 
The HPAEs are a highly diverse group of economies, differing in 
natural resources, population, culture, and economic policy. What are 
the characteristics that these eight economies shared that cause them to 
be grouped together and set apart from other developing economies? 
First, they had rapid, sustained growth between 1960 and 1990. This in 
itself is unusual among developing economies. Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between relative income level in 1960 and per capita 
income growth for a sample of 119 countries during the period 
1960-1985. This is the standard "convergence picture" first presented in 
Romer (1987). The figure also plots an estimated nonlinear relationship 
between initial income and growth.2 Per capita income growth is 
essentialy independent of the level of relative income in 1960. The fit of 
the regression is poor and the significance of individual coefficients 
low.3 
2. The regression line is the result of a regression of per capita income growth (in 
constant 1980 international prices) on 1960 income per capita, including nonlinear 
terms up to the second power. 
3. Dollar (1991) finds a similar pattern using a sample of 114 countries and the absolute 
level of per capita income in 1960. He finds a clearer pattern in which the lowest 
deciles have the lowest per capita income growth rates, the middle-income deciles 
have the highest, and the high-income countries are between. He also reports low 
significance of his regression results, however. 
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Figure 1 GDP GROWTH RATE, 1960-1985, AND GDP PER CAPITA, 1960 
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Note: This figure plots this regression equation: 
GDPG = 0.013 + 0.062RGDP60 - 0.061RGDP602. N - 119; R2 = 0.036. 
(0.004) (0.027) (0.033) 
Source: Summers and Heston (1991); Barro (1989); World Bank data. 
The eight HPAEs are all positive outliers in the income-growth 
distribution. While Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are closer to their 
predicted values, the remaining five economies, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong, are all significantly above their predicted 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capital growth rates on the basis of 
relative income level.4 All of the HPAEs were catching up to the more 
developed countries. 
Recent work on growth rate persistence suggests that growth rates 
for individual economies are highly unstable over time (Easterly et al., 
1993). The HPAEs, however, appear to be an exception. Depending on 
the time period selected and the definition of persistent success (in 
terms of the fraction of the distribution used to define high growth), the 
four tigers plus Japan consistently rank with the handful of persistently 
rapidly growing economies. Indeed, Easterly et al. conclude that "the 
widespread perception of strong country effects in growth is strongly 
influenced by the Gang of Four." 
4. Addition of a dummy variable (HPAE = 1) to the estimated equation appearing below 
Figure 1 increases the R2 to .242 and greatly improves the precision of the parameter 
estimates. The t value on the dummy variable (which is positive) is 4.00. 
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Figure 2 INCOME INEQUALITY AND GROWTH OF GDP, 1965-1989 
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Source: World Bank data. 
Where the HPAEs are unique in combining rapid, sustained growth 
with highly equal income distributions. The positive association be- 
tween growth and low inequality in the HPAEs, and the contrast with 
other economies, is illustrated in Figure 2. Forty economies are ranked 
by the ratio of the income share of the richest fifth of the population to 
the income share of the poorest fifth and per capital real GDP growth 
during 1965-1989.5 
The northwest corner of Figure 2 identifies economies with high 
growth (GDP per capita greater than 4.0%) and low relative inequality 
(ratio of the income share of the top quintile to that of the bottom 
5. Because the timing and frequency of observations on income distribution vary among 
countries in the sample, the ratio of the top to bottom quintile is taken at the date 
closest to the midpoint. 
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quintile less than 10). All of the high-growth, low-inequality economies 
are in East Asia. Seven are HPAEs; only Malaysia, which has an index of 
inequality above 15, is excluded. Within East Asia comparisons of 
growth rates and Gini coefficients by decade indicate that the distribu- 
tion of income was substantially more equal in the fastest-growing 
HPAEs. Moreover, improvements in income distribution generally coin- 
cided with periods of rapid growth (Birdsall and Sabot, 1993).6 
2. Fundamentalists, Mystics, and the Miracle 
To observe a miracle is not necessarily to understand it. As with those 
attempting to explain religious phenomena, economists analyzing the 
"miracle" of East Asia's growth tend to fall into two camps-funda- 
mentalists and mystics.7 Growth fundamentalists stress the dominant 
role of factor accumulation in explaining the HPAEs' high-income 
growth rates. They frequently qualify their explanations by noting that 
efficient allocation of resources, once accumulated, must also have been 
a part of the East Asian success story-since such economic laggards as 
the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have 
accumulated resources at equally impressive rates with radically differ- 
ent results.8 
Mystics, on the other hand, while acknowledging the importance of 
accumulation, tend to place greater stress on the role of the acquisition 
and mastery of technology. The dominant view-if there is one-is 
that the East Asian economies, particularly Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 
6. Two qualifications should be noted here. First, some studies of Korea have noted 
increasing inequality in recent years; however, most of this is due to rising value of 
assets, particularly land, rather than increased variation in incomes. Second, reductions 
in inequality in Thailand have been relatively minor compared to those in the other 
HPAEs, although Thailand's performance is still better than that of most developing 
economies. 
7. Recently a third group-predestinarians-has begun to emerge, placing great stress on 
the role of initial conditions in 1960, especially education and income equality, in 
explaining East Asia's persistently superior growth performance in cross-country re- 
gressions. Rodrik (1993) provides a survey of the relevant literature and some cross- 
country regressions. We do not consider their arguments further here since, if predesti- 
narian explanations are relevant, there are few lessons for development policy. This is 
perhaps why most predestinarian authors ultimately reveal themselves to be funda- 
mentalists or mystics in their policy interpretations of the miracle (see, e.g., Rodrik, 
1993). 
8. One of the most prominent fundamentalist tractarians, Alwyn Young (1993), has 
recently provided a succinct statement of their position. Although he subtitles his essay 
a "contrarian view," it is probably the dominant view among the Anglo-American 
economics establishment. 
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have been unusually successful at catching up technologically to the 
advanced economies.9 Empirical support for the mystical position is 
adduced from the high rates of total factor productivity growth esti- 
mated for industry in several of the HPAEs, notable Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan. 
The fundamentalist-mystic distinction is at the heart the debate on 
the public policy origins of East Asia's success. Fundamentalists have 
stressed East Asia's success in getting the basics right. They tend to 
attribute success to policies that increased physical and human capital 
per worker and that provided for efficient allocation. They argue that 
the successful Asian economies have been better than others at provid- 
ing a stable macroeconomic environment and a reliable legal framework 
to promote domestic and international competition. They also stress 
that the orientation of the HPAEs toward international trade and the 
absence of price controls and other distortionary policies have led to 
low relative price distortions. Investments in people-education and 
health-are important roles for government in the fundamentalist story 
(World Bank, 1991). 
In contrast to the fundamentalist view, which acknowledges rela- 
tively few cases of market failure, mystics contend that markets consis- 
tently fail to guide investment to industries that generate the highest 
growth. In East Asia, the mystics argue, governments remedied this by 
deliberately "getting the prices wrong" to promote industries that 
would not otherwise have thrived (Amsden, 1989). The mystics lay 
stress on the dynamic gains of activist government policies to alter 
industrial structure and promote technological learning, sometimes at 
the expense of static allocative efficiency. Moreover, while fundamental- 
ists would explain growth with a standard set of relatively constant 
policies, mystics note that the policy mixes used by East Asian economies 
were diverse and flexible. They argue that East Asian governments 
"governed the market" in critical ways (Wade, 1990). But the crucial 
question remains: Have interventions, per se, accelerated growth? 
The mystics have provided valuable insights into the history, role, 
and extent of East Asian interventions, demonstrating convincingly the 
scope of government actions to promote industrial development in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. They have successfully shown that East Asia 
does not wholly conform to the fundamentalist model. Industrial policy 
and interventions in financial markets are not easily reconciled with 
9. Amsden (1989, 1993) and Wade (1990) put forward this view. Interestingly, as Young 
(1993) points out, so do Balassa (1988) and Krueger (1990). They differ, of course, on the 
policy origins of East Asia's presumed success at technological catching up. 
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static allocative efficiency. Policies in some economies are much more in 
accord with models of state-led development. 
2.1 SOURCES OF THE MIRACLE-ACCUMULATION 
AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE 
Empirically, the fundamentalist-mystic debate can be viewed in terms 
of the relative roles of factor accumulation and productivity growth in 
explaining the HPAEs output growth.?0 How unusual are the HPAEs in 
terms of their rates of factor accumulation? Are the East Asian economies 
atypical in terms of their rates of productivity change? 
2.1.1 East Asia's Record of Accumulation The fundamentalist view of the 
success of the HPAEs is that their investment levels in physical and 
human capital substantially exceed those for other countries at similar 
levels of development, resulting in more rapid growth of per capita 
income. Figure 3 shows the relationship between income level in 1960 
and the average investment rate for 1960-1985. The estimated nonlin- 
ear regression relating initial income level to investment is also shown. 
There is substantially more regularity in the relationship between in- 
vestment share and relative income, than in the relationship between 
growth and relative income." The investment rate for all countries 
increases with income up to about 70% of U.S. GDP in 1960 and then 
declines. 
The HPAEs conform much more strongly to the cross-country pattern 
of investment rates than to the pattern of growth rates. Thailand and 
Hong Kong lie close to their predicted values on the basis of the 
cross-country regression. Japan, Korea, and Malaysia are the extreme 
outliers among HPAEs, but they are not extreme outliers in the distribu- 
tion.'2 High investment rates are part of the Asian success story, but 
they cannot fully explain the extent to which per capita income growth 
in the HPAEs diverges from the typical pattern. 
Figure 4(ab) summarizes the pattern of variation of two measures of 
human capital with initial income. Figure 4(a) plots the primary school 
enrollment rate in 1960 against relative per capita income, while 
10. While it is broadly correct to associate fundamentalism with policies to promote 
accumulation and efficient, static allocation, some mystics of the industrial policy 
school would point to such government initiatives as socialization and bounding of 
private risks in Korea and Japan as important policy tools that raised accumulation. 
11. The fit of the regression is markedly better, as is the variance of the estimated 
coefficients. 
12. Addition of a dummy variable (HPAE = 1) to the estimating equation appearing below Figure 4 does not increase the explanatory power of the regression. The t 
statistic on the dummy variable is 1.00. 
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Figure 4(b) presents the scatter of Barro and Lee's (1993) average 
measure of educational attainment over the period 1960-1985 against 
initial income. Both scatters confirm that the HPAEs were relatively well 
endowed with human capital but again conform more closely to the 
cross-country pattern based on relative income than is the case for 
income growth. 
2.1.2 Productivity Change TFP is estimated in a simple neoclassical 
framework by subtracting from output growth the portion of growth 
due to capital accumulation, to human capital accumulation, and to 
labor force growth. Assume that every economy has access to an 
international cross-economy production function of the form: 
Q = AF(K, E, L), (1) 
where A is total factor productivity, K is a measure of capital services, 
E is a measure of human capital endowments, and L is a measure of 
labor services in natural units. 
TFP change can be then found as the residual of growth of output 
per worker after deducting the contributions of human and physical 
Figure 3 AVERAGE INVESTMENT RATE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 
1960-1985, AND GDP PER CAPITAL LEVEL, 1960 
Average investment rate (percentage of GDP, 1960-85) 
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16085 = 10.125 + 59.120RGDP60 - 51.881RGDP602. N = 119; R2 = 0.295. 
(1.383) (10.344) (12.593) 
Sources: Summers and Heston (1991); Barro (1989); World Bank data. 
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Figure 4a INITIAL INCOME LEVEL AND PRIMARY ENROLLMENT RATE 
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capital accumulation: 
a = (q - 1) - sK(k - ) - sE(e- 1). (2) 
Under assumptions of competitive factor markets and constant returns 
to scale, SK and SE are equal to the income shares of factors. Thus, most 
empirical applications of Equation (2) estimate the output elasticity 
coefficients with income shares.13 
Because income share data are not available for most countries in our 
sample, we instead estimate the output elasticities directly using a 
simple, cross-economy production function. We regress annual log 
output growth on log capital growth, log human capital growth, and 
log labor growth between 1960 and 1990, constraining their coefficients 
to sum to unity (i.e., specifying the production function to be 
Cobb-Douglas). We also include economy-specific dummy variables to 
estimate individual rates of TFP change for each of the sample's 
economies. 
We estimate TFP change for 87 high- to low-income economies. The 
data set includes new constant price capital stock data (Nehru and 
Dhareshwar, 1993). Measures of human capital are incorporated in the 
specification using Barro and Lee's (1993) measure of educational attain- 
ment. Table 1 reports the production function parameters and the 
estimated TFP growth rates. 
The low elasticity of output with respect to capital from the cross- 
country sample is striking but not altogether surprising. There is a 
subset of developing economies in our data (13 in number) that have 
positive net investment and human capital growth per worker, but 
negative output per worker growth rates. In effect, the marginal prod- 
uct of both physical and human capital was negative in these economies, 
an indication of severe allocation inefficiency. Empirically, this is re- 
flected in a lower elasticity of output of both physical and human 
capital in the production function based on the whole sample than 
when only economies with nonnegative growth of output per worker 
are included. 
We have reestimated the production function based only on high- 
income economy input-output relationships. This is predicated on the 
assumption that allocation efficiency in the high-income economies is 
greater than in the whole sample and, hence, that TFP growth rates 
estimated on the basis of the production function parameters will 
contain loss "noise" due to allocation mistakes. These results and the 
estimated TFP growth rates derived from standard growth accounting 
13. This literature is briefly surveyed in Nishimizu and Page (1987). 
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methods are displayed in Table 1. The elasticity of output with respect 
to capital in the high-income economy production function rises to 
more conventional levels. TFP estimates, particularly for those 
economies within rapidly growing capital stocks, are correspondingly 
reduced. 
Figure 5 compares the TFP growth estimates from the two production 
functions. Three inferences are supported by both sets of estimates: 
1. The range of TFP growth rates for high-income countries is quite 
compact, especially in comparison with the low- and middle-income 
countries. 
2. Nearly one third (32%) of the low- and middle-income countries in 
the sample had negative rates of TFP growth for the period 
1960-1989, regardless of the parameter estimates used. 
3. There is very little productivity based "catch-up" exhibited by the 
low- and middle-income countries. 
Table 1 ELASTICITY OF OUTPUT WITH RESPECT O CAPITAL (SK), 
LABOR (SL), AND HUMAN CAPITAL (SH): FULL SAMPLE 
AND HIGH-INCOME CONOMIES 
Observations SK (t-stat) SL (t-stat) SH (t-stat) 
Full sample 2,093 0.178 10.895 0.669 6.411 0.154 1.49 
High-income 460 0.399 10.237 0.332 1.679 0.269 1.476 
economies 
RESULTING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ESTIMATES 
FOR THE HPAES (1960-1989) 
TFP growth 
(full-sample TFP growth (high- 
parameter income only, 
Economy estimates parameter estimates) 
Hong Kong 3.6470 2.4113 
Indonesia 1.2543 - 0.7953 
Japan 3.4776 1.4274 
Korea, Rep. of 3.1021 0.2355 
Malaysia 1.0755 -1.3369 
Singapore 1.1911 -3.0112 
Taiwan 3.7604 1.2829 
Thailand 2.4960 0.5466 
Latin America 0.1274 -0.9819 
Africa -0.9978 -3.0140 
Source: World Bank data. 
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Figure 5 COMPARISON OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES 
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These are not promising results for the developing world. Despite a 
substantial literature on the potential for developing countries to achieve 
rapid growth through the adoption of known, "best practice" technolo- 
gies, very few countries appear to have realized these potential gains.14 
Catch-up, where it is taking place, is due primarily to higher rates of 
factor accumulation. 
Three of the HPAEs are in the upper decile of the TFP distribution in 
both sets of estimates-Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan. Two others- 
Thailand and Korea-are in the upper decile of the distribution based 
on the full sample production function parameters, but they are unre- 
markable on the basis of the high-income country production function 
parameters.l5 Three-Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-shift from 
14. For a concise review of the arguments for technologically based catch-up, see Pack (1993). 
15. When we compare our estimates of TFP growth with two other independently 
derived estimates for a large sample of countries (Elias, 1991; Fischer, 1993), the 
pattern of productivity growth rates in Figure 5 is remarkably robust to the specifica- 
tion of the growth accounting equation and to the capital stock series used. The IMF 
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modest, but positive, TFP growth to negative TFP growth when the 
production function parameters are changed from those estimated from 
the whole sample to those derived from the high-income sample. 
Presumably in the high-income countries, most of the estimated TFP 
growth is due to technical progress-advances in best practice-which 
explains the relatively compact distribution of TFP growth rates be- 
tween 0.5% and 1.5% per year, and the tendency among the high- 
income countries for TFP growth to decline with rising income (World 
Bank, 1993). In low- and middle-income countries, however, changes in 
TFP must reflect more than technical progress, otherwise we would 
never find negative TFP growth rates. 
We have already argued that TFP growth for low- and middle- 
income economies contains an element of catching up to (or falling 
behind) best practice technologies. But TFP growth rates in a one-sec- 
tor, cross-country estimate will also contain an element of allocative 
efficiency; economies that allocate physical and human capital to low 
yielding investments will have low or negative estimated TFP growth 
rates. The clearest demonstrations of this are the 13 economies with 
negative output growth and positive accumulation. 
In an attempt to look at patterns of technologically based catch-up, 
we assume that the elasticities of output that should be used to 
calculate TFP change are those that apply to the high-income economies 
only. We subtract the average rate of TFP change for the high-income 
economies, which we associate with movements in international best 
practice, from TFP change to get an estimate of technical efficiency 
change. Using this method Hong Kong (2.0%), Japan (1.0%), Taiwan 
(0.8%), and Thailand (0.1%) are the only HPAEs catching up to interna- 
tional best practice. Korea (-0.2%) was essentially just keeping pace 
with technological progress in the high-income economies, while the 
investment driven economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore 
were falling behind international best practice at rates of 1.2% (In- 
donesia) to 3.5% (Singapore) per year (Table 2).16 
(1993) World Economic Outlook, contrasting Asia with other developing economies, 
reaches similar conclusions, both with respect to the estimated magnitudes of TFP 
change and the relative contribution of TFP change to output growth. Thomas and 
Wang (1993) and Edwards (1992) also reach broadly similar results concerning the 
pattern of productivity change in the HPAEs compared with other economies. 
16. Friedberg, Khamis, and Page (1993), using a cross-country stochastic frontier produc- 
tion function to estimate movements in international best practice, reach similar 
conclusions with respect to the pattern of technical efficiency change among the 
HPAEs. 
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Table 2 TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY CHANGE 
ESTIMATES FOR THE HPAES 
Technical efficiency change, 
Economy / Region 1960-1989 
Hong Kong 1.9714 
Indonesia -1.2352 
Japan 0.9876 
Korea, Rep. of - 0.2044 
Malaysia -1.7767 
Singapore - 3.4510 
Taiwan 0.8431 
Thailand 0.1067 
Latin America -1.4217 
Africa - 3.4539 
Source: World Bank data. 
When the HPAEs are contrasted with other developing regions, 
however, their ability to keep pace with international best practice 
seems somewhat more remarkable. Using the same method, we have 
estimated the average rate of technical efficiency change for Latin 
America (-1.4%) and Africa (-3.5%). Against these benchmarks, all of 
the HPAEs except Singapore stand up well in terms of their ability to 
keep pace with the world's shifting technological frontier.17 
What, then, are we to make of the fundamentalist-mystic debate? 
Figure 6 suggests that each camp can claim partial victory. The diagram 
shows the relative contribution to output growth of factor accumulation 
(share-weighted total input growth) and TFP growth. 
When the TFP estimates based on the high-income country sample 
are used, the dichotomy between investment driven and productivity 
driven economies is dramatic.18 Rapid growth in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
17. Alwyn Young (1992) in a well-known paper finds similarly disappointing results with 
respect to Singapore's TFP performance. Some caution is needed in interpreting these 
results, however. Much of Singapore's investment between 1960 and 1990 was in 
housing and social infrastructure, output of which are notoriously difficult to mea- 
sure. It is possible that we have undervalued the rate of growth of output and, hence, 
the rate of TFP change. Similar detailed criticisms could be made for other economies, 
both HPAE and non-HPAE, and our TFP results are best regarded as indicative of 
broad international trends. 
18. Despite the low elasticities of output with respect to capital in the full sample 
production function, only 10 of the 60 non-HPAE low- and middle-income economies 
have contributions of TFP growth exceeding 30%. Among the HPAEs, the 
investment-driven economies-Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-conform to a 
typical developing economy pattern with a low (but positive) TFP contribution to 
output growth. The productivity-driven economies-Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, 
Hong Kong, and Thailand-on the other hand are more unusual and look more like 
advanced economies with a relatively high contribution of TFP to output growth of 
above 30%. 
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and Singapore is wholly due to high rates of factor accumulation. 
Indeed, their productivity performance, like that of the vast majority of 
developing economies, detracted from the potential output growth that 
could have been achieved, based on their rates of factor accumulation. 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan in contrast had relatively high TFP 
growth rates and derived from 15% to 30% of their output growth from 
TFP growth, a characteristic shared by only four other developing 
economies. Thailand and Korea had rates and relative contributions of 
TFP growth that were atypical for developing economies-they were 
positive-but less than the relative share for advanced economies. The 
contrasting sources of growth of Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore, all 
of which shared essentially the same rate of growth, are a good 
illustration of the varying roads to rapid growth among the HPAEs. 
The East Asian success story is, then, primarily a fundamentalist one. 
Depending on the estimates used, between 60% and 120% of their 
output growth derives from accumulation of physical and human 
capital and labor force growth. The results also suggest that the HPAEs 
were unusually successful in allocating these factors of production. The 
estimates of TFP growth based on the full sample address the following 
question: Based on the average efficiency with which physical and 
Figure 6 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND PART OF 
GROWTH DUE TO GROWTH OF FACTOR INPUTS, 1960-1989 
(HIGH-INCOME SAMPLE PARAMETERS) 
TFP GROWTH (percent p.a.) 30% 4 
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human capital are used in the world economy, does accumulation over- 
or underpredict income growth? The answer is that for most low- and 
middle-income economies, it overpredicts growth, while for the HPAEs 
it underpredicts. Even when the production function is estimated from 
the high-income sample only, accumulation underpredicts growth for 
five of the eight. 
Nevertheless, mystics can claim some victories. The subset of produc- 
tivity-driven HPAEs are unusual among developing economies because 
of the relatively important role of TFP in their growth, even when 
attempts are made, as here, to correct for the gains from superior 
accumulation.9 They are also among the very few developing countries 
keeping pace with or catching up to the moving target of international 
best practice. Two of the productivity-driven economies-Taiwan and 
Japan-are among the East Asian economies most identified with 
activist policies to promote technological learning. Hong Kong-the 
most productivity driven of all of the HPAEs-in contrast is the least 
interventionist of the group. Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are economies in 
which activist policies to allocate resources were undertaken, yet appar- 
ently without the deleterious effects that characterized the performance 
of other economies with similar policies. 
2.2 THE POLICY ORIGINS OF SUCCESS 
The HPAEs have achieved rapid growth through successful attainment 
of both fundamentalist and mystic objectives. They have performed 
better than most low- and middle-income countries three critical func- 
tions-accumulation, allocation, and technological catch-up. They did 
this with combinations of policies ranging from market-oriented to state 
led that varied both across economies and over time. 
Despite the diversity there are a number of common policy threads 
that bind the HPAEs. Macroeconomic management was unusually good 
and macroeconomic performance unusually stable, providing the essen- 
tial framework for private investment. Policies to increase the integrity 
of the banking system, and to make it more accessible to nontraditional 
savers, increased the levels of financial savings. Education policies that 
focused on primary and secondary education generated rapid increases 
in labor force skills. Agricultural policies stressed productivity change 
19. Technical efficiency change-movement toward best practice-should be free of the 
allocative gains characteristic of TFP estimates by growth accounting methods (see 
Nishimizu and Page, 1982). Friedberg, Khamis, and Page (1993), using a stochastic 
frontier production function, find that the HPAEs are the only regional grouping of 
developing countries that have consistently closed the gap with international best 
practice. 
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and did not tax the rural economy excessively. All of the HPAEs kept 
price distortions within reasonable bounds and were open to foreign 
ideas and technology. 
But these fundamental policies do not tell the entire story. In most of 
these economies, in one form or another, the government intervened 
-systematically and through multiple channels-to foster develop- 
ment, and in some cases the development of specific industries. Policy 
interventions took many forms-targeted and subsidized credit to se- 
lected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowing rates to 
increase profits and retained earnings, protection of domestic import 
substitutes, subsidies to declining industries, the establishment and 
financial support of government banks, public investments in applied 
research, firm- and industry-specific export targets, development of 
export marketing institutions, and wide sharing of information between 
public and private sectors. Some industries were promoted, while 
others were not. These strategies of selective promotion were closely 
associated with high rates of private investment and, in some of the 
HPAEs, high rates of productivity growth. 
The relative importance of policy fundamentals and selective inter- 
ventions has been and will continue to be at the center of the debate 
over the policy origins of East Asia's success. To consider in any depth 
the catalogue of policies outlined earlier exceeds the scope of this essay. 
Rather, we examine four possible lessons for public policy arising from 
the HPAEs success. 
3. Conventional Wisdom-Macroeconomic Management 
and Educational Strategy 
Among fundamental economic policies that have contributed to East 
Asia's superior record of accumulation and allocation of resources, two 
stand out-good macroeconomic management and emphasis on broadly 
based education.20 The nature of the policies pursued and their impact 
on growth in the HPAEs are described briefly in the following. 
3.1 MAINTAINING MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
In contrast with many other developing economies, the HPAEs have 
been remarkably successful in creating and sustaining macroeconomic 
20. World Bank (1993) enumerates a number of other "policy fundamentals" that have 
acted primarily to increase accumulation and improve allocation. These are omitted 
here to allow for a fuller discussion of the two described. Of the omitted fundamen- 
tals, perhaps the most significant is the focus on building secure, bank-based financial 
systems. 
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Table 3 CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS, SELECTED 
EAST ASIAN AND OTHER ECONOMIES 
Average public deficit, Rank among 40 
percentage of GDP, developing countries 
Economy / Region 1980-1988 (1 = highest deficit) 
HPAEs 
Korea, Rep. of 1.89 34 
Malaysia 10.80 6 
Thailand 5.80 23 
Average, 40 developing economies 6.39 
Average, OECD economies 2.82 
Other economies 
Argentina 9.62 
Brazil 4.02 
Mexico 6.73 
Philippines 4.40 
Source: Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel (forthcoming). 
stability. Here we consider the HPAEs' successful management of three 
macroeconomic variables: budget deficits, external debt, and exchange 
rates. 
3.1.1 Budget Deficits and Inflation International experience suggests that 
the macroeconomic consequences of public sector deficits depends on 
how they are financed. Although the HPAEs' budget deficits are not 
dramatically smaller as a group than those of other developing 
economies, they were better at keeping deficits within the limits im- 
posed by their ability to finance them without destabilizing the macroe- 
conomy.21 The financing limits themselves were also higher due to the 
more rapid growth of the HPAEs. 
Table 3 shows consolidated public sector deficits for the 1980s for 
three developing country HPAEs that have good data compared with a 
sample of OECD and other developing economies. As a percentage of 
21. The analysis in this section draws on W. Easterly and K. Schmidt-Hebbel, "The 
Macroeconomics of Public Sector Deficits: a Synthesis" in W. Easterly, C. Rodriguez, 
and K. Schmidt-Hebbel, eds., Public Sector Deficits and Macroeconomic Performance, 
Oxford University Press (forthcoming). The data on consolidated public deficits, as 
well as the rest of the data in this section except where otherwise indicated, are from 
the same source. Consolidated public deficits, though less widely available than 
central government deficits, are a much more reliable indicator of fiscal management, 
because they include operating deficits of public enterprises that have played a critical 
role in some macroeconomic crises. 
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GDP, Korea's budget deficits were below even the OECD average. 
Malaysia and Thailand are more complicated. Thailand's budget deficits 
were about average for developing economies in the 1980s, while 
deficits in Malaysia were substantially bigger than average. Both ran 
larger budget deficits than such troubled economies as the Philippines, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. 
Unlike these and other economies that encountered difficulties, how- 
ever, Malaysia and Thailand successfully financed their deficits. This 
was possible for the following reasons: 
* First, there was feedback from high growth. Because rapid growth 
increased the demand for financial assets, Malaysia and Thailand 
were able to absorb higher levels of monetary financing without a 
rapid rise in inflation. Moreover, rapid growth in GDP raised the level 
of sustainable domestic and external borrowing. 
* Second, there was feedback from high financial savings. Savings rates 
were high in Malaysia and Thailand, and much of this saving went 
into the domestic financial system (as opposed to real assets or capital 
flight as in Latin America). This further increased the demand for 
money and other domestic financial assets, making increased domes- 
tic financing of the deficit possible without resort to inflationary 
financing. In Malaysia, the government Provident Fund mobilized 
domestic saving for the government's use in noninflationary financ- 
ing of the deficit. 
* Third, there were low initial debt ratios. In Thailand, the initial level of 
external debt to GDP was very low, which meant that external 
financing was available when needed. 
By holding public deficits within the bounds of prudent financing, 
the HPAEs have avoided the inflation-inducing bursts of money cre- 
ation that afflict other developing economies. Figure 7 shows money 
creation as a ratio to GDP in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand and in three 
unstable comparators, Argentina, Mexico, and Zaire. The contrast is 
striking: While money creation has been relatively constant among the 
HPAEs, each of the comparators experienced two episodes of rapid 
money creation when fiscal balances deteriorated or external financing 
dried up. 
Moderate inflation was a corollary of fiscal prudence (Table 4) .22 East 
Asian governments never had to rely heavily on the inflation tax 
22. Recent research suggests that inflation below 20%, a level not breached by any of the HPAEs during their rapid growth periods, can be maintained for long periods 
without generating macroeconomic instability (Dombusch and Fischer, 1993). 
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because their deficits were within financable limits. In general, HPAE 
governments have been strong enough to alter public spending and 
foreign borrowing as needed, although in Thailand this has been a 
continuous struggle (Warr and Nadhiprabha, 1993). 
One result of low-to-moderate inflation rates particularly welcome to 
business is stable real interest rates. Figure 8 shows real interest rates in 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Argentina, Ghana, and Mexico. As with 
money creation, the contrast is remarkable. In the East Asian cases, low 
inflation and flexible financial policies kept real interest rates within a 
narrow range. 
Figure 7 REVENUES FROM MONEY CREATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
GDP: EXAMPLES FROM EAST ASIA AND OTHER SELECTED 
ECONOMIES 
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Source: World Bank data. 
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3.1.2 Managing Foreign Debt Of the seven developing HPAEs, only 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand have public or publicly guar- 
anteed foreign debt. The governments of the others-Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan-have not borrowed abroad. None of the four with 
foreign debt has faced a crisis in the sense of having to reschedule debt, 
but sharp increases in debt have led to rapid adjustment. 
In Korea in 1980-1985, Malaysia in 1982-1988, and Indonesia since 
1987, debt to GNP ratios have been quite high compared with other 
indebted economies (Table 5). As with fiscal deficits, however, favorable 
feedback from other policies enabled the HPAE debtors to sustain 
higher ratios of external debt to GDP than other economies. In particu- 
lar, high levels of exports have meant that foreign exchange was readily 
available to service the foreign debt. For example, when Mexico faced 
severe problems with its creditors in 1982, it had a much lower debt to 
GNP ratio than Korea in 1984 but a much higher debt to export ratio. 
3.1.3 Exchange Rate Management The evolution of exchange rate regimes 
in the HPAEs has been broadly similar. Most moved from long-term 
fixed rate regimes to fixed-but-adjustable rate regimes with occasional 
steep devaluations to managed floating rate regimes. Due to the combi- 
nation of moderate inflation and active exchange rate management, the 
HPAEs avoided the severe exchange rate appreciation that beset Africa 
Table 4 INFLATION RATES 
Average CPI, 
Economy / Region 1961-1991 
HPAEsa 7.5 
Hong Kongb 8.8 
Indonesiac 12.4 
Korea, Rep. of 12.2 
Malaysia 3.4 
Singapore 3.6 
Taiwan 6.2 
Thailand 5.6 
All low- and middle-income economies 61.8 
South Asia 8.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.0 
Latin America and Caribbean 192.1 
aAverages are unweighted 
b1972-91 only. 
c1969-91 only. 
Sources: World Bank data; World Bank (1992); Taiwan (1992). 
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Figure 8 REAL INTEREST RATES: EXAMPLES FROM EAST ASIA AND OTHER 
SELECTED ECONOMIES 
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and Latin America (Table 6) and achieved unusual stability of the real 
exchange rate. The HPAEs' success at maintaining stable real exchange 
rates is apparent in Figure 9, which contrasts real exchange rates since 
1970 in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand with those in Sri Lanka, Ar- 
gentina, and Peru. 
RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS One important 
element of the HPAEs' capacity to maintain macroeconomic stability 
has been their prompt and effective response to macroeconomic shocks. 
The HPAEs made definite policy decisions to keep the macroeconomy 
under control, rather than simply benefiting from a feedback from rapid 
growth to macroeconomic stability. These decisions are illustrated by 
the experiences of Korea and Thailand in adjusting to rather different 
macroeconomic shocks. 
KOREA RETRENCHES In 1979, Korea encountered a variety of problems 
that threatened to undercut the 1970s impressive growth. Rising oil 
prices depressed the terms of trade, the world recession dampened 
export demand, and high interest rates increased debt service costs. 
Real appreciation during the 1974-1979 fixed exchange rate regime had 
made exports less competitive, the rice crop had failed, and the assassi- 
nation of President Park Chung-Hee had exacerbated political uncer- 
tainty (Collins and Park, 1989). Korea responded with an aggressive 
1980 stabilization package backed by IMF standby credits. The govern- 
Table 5 INTERNATIONAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Ratio of total debt to 
Ratio of total debt exported goods 
to GNP and services 
Economy / Region Peak yeara 1991 Peak yeara 1991 
HPAEs 
Indonesia 69 66.4 263.5 225.6 
Korea, Rep. of 52.5 15.0 142.4 45.2 
Malaysia 86.5 47.6 138.4 54.2 
Thailand 47.8 39.0 171.7 94.8 
All low- and middle-income 38.4 176.2 
economies 
South Asia 29.6 293.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 106.1 340.8 
Latin America and Caribbean 37.4 268.0 
a1987 for Indonesia, and 1985 or 1986 for the other three countries. 
Source: World Bank data. 
242 PAGE 
ment ended the fixed exchange rate regime, devalued the won by 17%, 
and tightened monetary and fiscal policy. In 1980, output fell 5%, 
inflation exceeded 25%, and the current account deficit approached 9% 
of GDP. By 1982 inflation dropped to 7% and in 1983 to 3.4%. The 
current account deficit fell to 2% of GDP in 1983. 
GRADUAL ADJUSTMENT IN THAILAND Thailand only partially adjusted to 
the first oil shock and in the late 1970s engaged in a mild private and 
public spending boom. By 1980-1981, the consolidated public sector 
deficit was 7% of GDP, nearly half of which was the deficit of the 
nonfinancial public enterprises, and the current account deficit was also 
about 7%. Because past foreign borrowing had been moderate-the 
debt/GDP ratio was only 35% in 1982-Thailand continued to have 
access to international capital markets. Even so, the new government 
that took over in 1980 perceived that macroeconomic adjustment was 
needed. 
Monetary policy options were limited by the fixed exchange rate and 
the relatively open capital market. Therefore, the government took the 
alternative path, fiscal contraction, moving gradually but consistently 
Table 6 AVERAGE APPRECIATION INDEX, 1976-1985 
Index (higher value Percentage rank (100 
means more means most 
Economy appreciated)a appreciated, 0 least) 
HPAEs 
Hong Kong 64 1 
Indonesia 98 25 
Korea, Rep. of 110 41 
Malaysia 88 12 
Singapore 87 11 
Taiwan 116 47 
Thailand 75 5 
Other selected economies 
Argentina 113 45 
Bolivia 181 89 
Cote d'Ivoire 185 90 
Ghana 248 99 
Nigeria 277 100 
Zaire 201 95 
aDollar's index is based on Summers-Heston purchasing power parity comparisons. An index 
value of 100 signifies that the economy's deviation from PPP is where it should be given its per 
capita income. 
Source: Dollar (1992). 
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Figure 9 EXAMPLES OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE VARIABILITY IN EAST 
ASIA AND OTHER SELECTED ECONOMIES 
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over the next several years to cut expenditures and increase revenues. 
Policymakers steeply cut deficits of the nonfinancial public enterprises, 
then gradually reduced the central government deficit. As a result, the 
consolidated government deficit declined from 8% of GDP in 1981-1982 
to 1.6% in 1986-1987, when adjustment was essentially complete. 
Meanwhile, steeper tax rates and tougher collection efforts boosted 
central government tax revenue from 13% of GDP in 1982 to 16% in 
1988. 
3.1.4 Macroeconomic Management and Rapid Growth It cannot be a coinci- 
dence that all of these seven economies have been exceptional high- 
growth economies by world standards, and all have had unusual 
success managing their macro economies over the long run. Cross-econ- 
omy, econometric studies generally find that higher inflation, larger 
budget deficits, and distorted foreign exchange markets reduce growth 
(Fischer, 1993; Rodrick, 1993). All of the HPAEs but Indonesia and 
Korea have been long-period, low-inflation economies, while Indonesia 
and Korea fall into the moderately low-inflation category. 
The channels by which inflation and budget deficits reduce growth 
are also of some interest. Fischer (1993) concludes that high inflation 
and high-budget deficits reduce both the rate of capital accumulation 
and the rate of productivity change. Uncertainty, arising primarily from 
the variability of inflation and the inconsistency of relative price signals, 
reduces both private investment and the efficiency of resource alloca- 
tion. 
The HPAEs provide at least partial confirmation of this hypothesis. 
Figure 10 shows private and public investment as a share of GDP for a 
sample of 47 low- and middle-income countries (including five of the 
developing country HPAEs) for which consistent data are available.23 
The HPAEs are remarkable for their high share of private investment. 
Private investment is about seven percentage points higher in the 
HPAEs than in other middle-income economies. It rose from about 15% 
of GDP in 1970 to nearly 22% in 1974, then declined and held at about 
18% between 1975 and 1984. Private investment contracted sharply 
between 1984 and 1986, reflecting the global recession, then recovered 
by 1988.24 In contrast, private investment in other low- and middle-in- 
come countries has remained relatively stable at about 11% of GDP. 
23. The data are drawn from Pfeffermann and Madarassy (1992). 
24. This basic pattern is observed in four individual economies-Korea, Thailand, Singa- 
pore, and Malaysia. The pattern for Indonesia differs; real private investment declined 
continuously during the 1980s from a peak of 20% of GDP to a low of 13% in 1989. 
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One important element of the HPAEs' capacity to maintain macroeco- 
nomic stability has been their prompt and effective response to macro- 
economic shocks. This has been greatly facilitated by two characteristics. 
First, by limiting transfers to public enterprises and tightly supervising 
banks, governments reduced the spillover from the real sector into the 
financial sector that in other economies exacerbated fiscal woes. Second, 
flexible labor and capital markets enabled the real sector to react quickly 
to government initiatives, setting off new growth cycles that eased the 
recessionary impact of stabilization measures. 
Effective responses to macroeconomic shocks may also have con- 
tributed to the HPAEs' long-run growth. Relatively cautious fiscal and 
foreign borrowing policies meant that serious debt crises were avoided, 
Figure 10 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
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which reduced the stop-go pattern of crisis and response that charac- 
terized many developing economies in the 1980s. Avoiding crisis and 
the need for rescheduling meant that credit-worthiness was main- 
tained, and it was easier to borrow in the short term and to avoid very 
deep cuts, especially in investment. 
In the 1970s overall levels of public investment did not differ markedly 
between the HPAEs and other developing economies; over the decade 
public investment rates in all economies rose from about 7% to 10% 
(Figure 10). During the 1980s, public investment was higher in the 
HPAEs than in other developing economies, but it had declined to 
historical levels by the end of the decade. The HPAEs as a group 
responded to the economic contraction of the 1980s by increasing public 
investment above historically maintained levels. Sudden reductions in 
aggregate demand and in investment compelled by debt crises were 
major causes of the sharp declines in growth rates in many of the 
heavily indebted economies of Latin America and elsewhere. 
Better responses to macroeconomic shocks may also have resulted in 
better measured productivity growth. A recent examination of the 
sources of TFP change in developing countries concludes that in Latin 
America and Africa, productivity levels increased relative to interna- 
tional best practice until 1973 and declined from 1973 onward, primarily 
due to the inability of these economies to adapt to external shocks. The 
decline was large enough in Latin America (and nearly large enough in 
Africa) to offset gains due to technical progress (Friedberg, Khamis, and 
Page, 1993). 
The HPAEs, in contrast, are the only regional grouping of developing 
economies that show steady improvement in productivity levels rela- 
tive to international best practice. While macroeconomic contractions 
are clearly visible in the HPAEs' pattern of movement of productivity 
levels over time, the difference is the more rapid return to prior 
productivity levels following the period of adjustment. 
3.2 BROADLY BASED EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES 
In most of the economies of East Asia, public investments in education 
were not only larger than elsewhere in absolute terms-they were also 
better. They responded more appropriately to failures in the market for 
education. Social rates of return to education are probably highest at 
the primary level, where there are many positive externalities associ- 
ated with literacy (Psacharopoulos, 1993). Capital market imperfections 
and information problems, moreover, are also most severe at the pri- 
mary level, reducing the scope for self-financed private systems. Re- 
turns from training at the university level, on the other hand, are 
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almost fully captured by the higher income of university graduates. All 
of this argues for universal primary and broadly based secondary 
education combined with restraint of public subsidies to higher educa- 
tion. 
3.2.1 Educational Performance in the HPAEs This was precisely the edu- 
cational strategy adopted by the HPAEs. Figures 11 and 12 present a 
stylized summary of the results of regressing primary and secondary 
enrollment rates on per capita national income for more than 90 
developing economies for the years 1965 and 1987.25 Enrollment rates 
are higher at higher levels of per capita income. But HPAE enrollment 
rates have tended to be higher than predicted for their level of income. 
At the primary level, this was most obvious in 1965, when Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan had already achieved universal primary 
education, well ahead of other developing economies, and even In- 
donesia with its vast population had a primary enrollment rate above 
70%. 
By 1987, East Asia's superior education systems were evident at the 
secondary level. Indonesia had a secondary enrollment rate of 46%, 
well above other economies with roughly the same level of income, and 
Korea had moved from 35% to 88%, maintaining its large lead in 
relative performance. Only in Thailand was the 28% secondary enroll- 
ment rate well below the income-predicted 36% and the 54% mean for 
middle-income economies.26 In recent years Thailand's weak educa- 
tional performance has been felt, as serious shortages of educated 
workers have begun to threaten continued very rapid growth. In part 
as a function of their success in increasing enrollment, the East Asian 
economies have also been faster to close the gap between male and 
female enrollments. 
A common, though imperfect measure of educational quality, is 
expenditures per pupil. Between 1970 and 1989, real expenditures per 
pupil at the primary level rose by 355% in Korea. In Mexico and Kenya, 
expenditures rose by 64% and 38%, respectively, over the same time 
period, and in Pakistan expenditures rose by only 13% between 1970 
and 1985 (Birdsall and Sabot, 1993). These dramatic differences reflect 
25. Behrman and Schneider (1992). The regressions control for a polynomial in average 
per capita income in the relevant year. The authors used per capita GNP at official 
exchange rates as the measure of income. 
26. Despite increasing its secondary enrollment rate from 29% to 74%, Hong Kong also 
fell well below the predicted level in 1987. This is because, at $15,000, the per capita 
income of Hong Kong was so high that the OECD countries were now its compara- 
tors. 
Figure 11 CROSS-ECONOMY REGRESSION FOR PRIMARY ENROLLMENT RATES, 1965 AND 1987 
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mostly differential changes over the period in income growth and in 
the number of children entering schools, both of which favored the East 
Asian economies. A somewhat better measure of school quality is the 
performance of children on tests of cognitive skills, standardized across 
economies. In the relatively few international comparisons available 
from such tests, East Asian children tend to perform better than chil- 
dren from other developing regions-and even, recently, better than 
children from high income economies.27 Table 7 offers some compara- 
tive data on expenditures per pupil in the HPAEs and other countries 
between 1965 and 1989. 
3.2.2 Focusing Educational Spending Higher shares of national income 
devoted to education cannot fully explain the larger accumulation of 
human capital in the HPAEs. In both 1960 and 1989, public expenditure 
on education as a percentage of GNP was not much higher in East Asia 
than elsewhere (Table 8). In 1960 the share was 2.2% for all developing 
economies, 2.4% for sub-Saharan Africa, and 2.5% for East Asia. Over 
the three decades that followed, governments of East Asia markedly 
increased the share of national output they invested in formal educa- 
tion. But so did governments in other developing regions. In 1989 the 
share in Africa, 4.1%, was higher than the East Asian share, 3.7%, which 
barely exceeded the average share for all developing economies, 3.6%.28 
The allocation of public expenditure between basic and higher educa- 
tion is the major public policy factor that accounts for East Asia's 
extraordinary performance with regard to the quantity of basic educa- 
tion provided. The share of public expenditure on education allocated 
to basic education has been consistently higher in East Asia than 
elsewhere. The share of public funds allocated to tertiary education in 
East Asia has tended to be low, averaging roughly 15% over the 
last three decades.29 In Latin America the share has been roughly 
27. Birdsall and Sabot (1993) cite Stevenson and Stigler (1992), among others, who report 
results of tests in cities of Japan, the United States, and Taiwan. 
28. Government expenditure on education, expressed as a percentage of GNP, was used 
as an explanatory variable in a cross-country regression in which expected years of 
schooling of the school-age cohort (essentially an aggregate of enrollment rates) is the 
independent variable. For a sample of 15 Asian and Latin American countries, the 
expenditure variable was insignificant. See Tan and Mingat (1992). 
29. In Korea and Taiwan the share of public expenditure on education allocated to higher 
education has increased over the last decade or so for two reasons. On the one hand, 
universal and near universal enrollment rates have been achieved at the primary and 
secondary levels, respectively. On the other hand, the increase has been consistent 
with the shift in the structure of production and exports to more technologically 
sophisticated and skill-intensive products, and the consequent increase in the demand 
for engineers and other skilled workers. 
Table 7 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (U.S. DOLLARS) 
1965 1975 1985 1989 
Economy Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
HPAEs 
Hong Kong 192.3 180.5 558.1 810.2 
Korea, Rep. of 9.9 14.7 51.2 32.9 389.8 352.5 609.6 449.9 
Malaysia 351.2 572.5 
Singapore 193.3 314.7 834.0 
Thailand 17.6 67.7 49.0 74.8 133.0 188.1 229.5 
Other selected economies 
Brazil 76.9 179.1 155.4 225.2 
Ghana 22.3 122.0 27.9 62.3 36.3 78.0 
India 5.3 71.3 17.5 30.9 38.1 
Kenya 28.9 336.7 50.3 149.7 62.2 290.4 
Mexico 23.8 56.6 110.2 315.2 101.9 287.5 93.8 300.2 
Pakistan 5.9 7.1 15.9 33.4 21.1 122.6 
Note: Cells are empty where data are unavailable. Source: Computed from UNESCO and World Bank data. 
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Table 8 PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP 
Economy/Region 1960 1989 
HPAEs 
Hong Kong 2.8 
Korea, Rep. of 2.0 3.6 
Singapore 2.8 3.4 
Malaysia 2.9 5.6 
Thailand 2.3 3.2 
Indonesiaa 2.5 0.9 
Averageb 2.5 3.7 
Other 
Brazil 1.9 3.7 
Pakistan 1.1 2.6 
Less developed 1.3 3.1 
economiesc 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 4.1 
aAlternative sources of data indicate that expenditure on public 
education as a percentage of GDP was 3.0% in Indonesia in 1989. 
Average does not include Indonesia. 
CLower- and middle-income economies. 
Source: United Nations Development Program (1991). 
24%.30 In South Asia the share is close to the Latin American level. This 
had been the case in Africa as well, but in recent years the share has 
declined to East Asian levels. 
The broad base of human capital was critically important to rapid 
growth in the HPAEs. Because the HPAEs attained universal primary 
education early, literacy was high and cognitive skill levels were sub- 
stantially above those in other developing economies. Basic education 
in the HPAEs is highly oriented to the acquisition of general academic 
skills, while postsecondary education tends to be oriented toward 
vocational skills. Some HPAEs have also been unusually large-scale 
importers of educational services, particularly in vocationally and tech- 
nologically sophisticated disciplines. Firms, therefore, had an easier 
time upgrading the skills of their workers and mastering new technol- 
ogy. In addition, rapid human capital accumulation reduced income 
inequality by increasing the relative abundance of educated workers, 
thereby lowering the scarcity rents associated with cognitive skills. 
30. Given the smaller size of the basic education age cohort in East Asia than in Latin 
America, this difference underestimates the gap between the two regions in the 
strength of the public sector's commitment to basic education. 
The East Asian Miracle ? 253 
These benefits were particularly evident in the countryside (Birdsall 
and Sabot, 1993). 
4. Unconventional Wisdom-The Export Push 
and Industrial Policies 
Most East Asian governments have pursued sector-specific industrial 
policies to some degree. The best known instances include Japan's 
heavy industry promotion policies of the 1950s and the subsequent 
imitation of these policies in Korea. These policies included import 
protection as well as subsidies for capital and other imported inputs. 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and even Hong Kong have also estab- 
lished programs-typically with more moderate incentives-to ac- 
celerate development of advanced industries. In the capital market, 
governments intervened systematically both to control interest rates 
and to direct credit. 
Industrial targeting could have resulted in extensive rent seeking and 
great inefficiency. Because it apparently did not, the success or failure of 
selective interventions are among the most controversial aspects of the 
East Asian success story. Some of the reasons why selective interven- 
tions do not appear to have had the disastrous results of those pursued 
in other developing economies are straightforward. Labor market poli- 
cies in the HPAEs tended to emphasize flexibility and competitive 
determination of wages (Fields, 1993). Directed credit programs were 
undertaken within a framework of generally low subsidies to borrowers 
and careful monitoring (Vittas and Cho, 1993). As a consequence, the 
relative prices of labor and capital in the HPAEs were closer to their 
scarcity values than in other developing economies (World Bank, 1993). 
Nevertheless, abundant evidence exists that, especially in the cases of 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, governments made systematic efforts to alter 
industrial structure for the purpose of accelerating productivity change. 
The impact of these policies on the HPAEs growth remains a topic of 
heated debate.31 This section proposes two policy lessons: first, that 
promotion of manufactured exports was a significant source of mea- 
sured TFP change, and second, that industrial policies mattered rela- 
tively little in the overall record of East Asia's extraordinary growth. 
The upshot of these propositions is that export-not industrial-pro- 
motion was at the heart of the HPAEs' productivity performance. 
31. See, e.g., the collection of essays in World Development (1994); Rodrik (1993), critically 
reviewing World Bank (1993). 
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4.1 EXPORT GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE 
Although all HPAEs except Hong Kong passed through an import 
substitution phase, with high and variable protection of domestic im- 
port substitutes, these periods ended earlier than in other economies. 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore adopted trade regimes that were 
close to free trade; Japan, Korea, and Taiwan adopted mixed regimes 
that were largely free for export industries. Indonesia and Thailand 
have in the 1980s begun to reduce protection. Exchange rate policies 
were liberalized, and currencies frequently devalued, to support export 
growth.32 
Export push strategies were implemented in three very different 
ways in the HPAEs. Hong Kong and Singapore established free-trade 
regimes, linking their domestic prices to international prices; the export 
push was an outcome of the very limited size of the domestic market 
coupled with neutral incentives between producing for the domestic or 
international market. Both economies made export credit available, 
although they did not subsidize it, and Singapore focused its efforts on 
attracting foreign investment in exporting firms. 
In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, incentives were essentially neutral on 
average between import substitutes and exports. But within the traded- 
goods sector, export incentives coexisted with substantial remaining 
protection of the domestic market. Export incentives, moreover, were 
not neutral among industries or firms. There was an effort in Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan to promote specific exporting industries. 
Protection was combined with either compulsion or strong incentives to 
export. In Korea, firm specific export targets were employed; in Japan 
and Taiwan access to subsidized export credit and undervaluation of 
the currency acted as an offset to the protection of the local market. 
What was important in all cases was that governments were credibly 
committed to the promotion of manufactured exports. They adopted an 
export push strategy.33 
The HPAEs' export performance is reflected in their steadily rising 
share of world exports (Table 9). As a group, the HPAEs increased their 
share in world exports from 7.9% in 1965 to 13.1% in 1980 and 18.2% in 
32. Corden (1993) refers to this as "exchange rate protection." 
33. Colin Bradford was the first to introduce the concept of export push into the analysis 
of East Asia's rapid growth. He has defined it as effective exchange rates for 
exportables exceeding those for importables (Bradford, 1994). We use the term 
somewhat more broadly to indicate a credible commitment to a policy regime that will 
ultimately yield effective exchange rates for exportables equal to or greater than the 
EER for importables. 
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Table 9 EXPORT PENETRATION, SELECTED EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES, 
1965-1990 
Share in developing 
Share in world exports economy exports 
Economy 1965 1980 1990 1965 1980 1990 
Total exports 
Japan 5.0 7.0 9.0 - - 
Four tigersa 1.5 3.8 6.7 6.0 13.3 33.9 
Southeast Asian NIEsb 1.5 2.2 2.4 6.2 7.8 12.4 
HPAE Subtotal 7.9 13.1 18.2 12.2 21.1 56.3 
All developing economies 24.2 28.7 19.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
World 100 100 100 - 
Exports of manufactures 
Japan 7.8 11.6 11.8 
Four tigersa 1.5 5.3 7.9 13.2 44.9 61.5 
Southeast Asian NIEsb 0.1 0.4 1.5 1.1 3.8 12.0 
HPAE Sub-total 9.4 17.3 21.3 14.2 48.6 73.5 
All developing economies 11.1 11.8 12.9 100 100 100 
World 100 100 100 - - 
aRepublic of Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
bIndonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Source: UN Trade Systems data. 
1990. Manufactured exports have provided most of this growth. From 
1965 to 1990, Japan emerged as the world's biggest exporter of manufac- 
tured goods, increasing its share of the world market from nearly 8% to 
almost 12%. In the 1970s and 1980s, the locus of growth shifted to the 
four tigers, whose share of manufactured exports grew nearly four 
times faster than Japan's (Table 9). Beginning around 1980, the three 
southeast Asian HPAEs (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand), historically 
dependent on commodity exports, recorded a similar but so far smaller 
surge in manufactured exports. 
Some analysts have, with hindsight, attributed these achievements to 
unique cultural and geographical circumstances. But there was little 
evidence at the outset that East Asian economies would achieve such 
spectacular results. In the 1950s even trade optimists were export 
pessimists and did not anticipate that Korea's exports would grow four 
times as fast as world trade over the next 30 years.34 One obvious effect 
of rapid export growth has been a marked increase in the openness of 
34. See, e.g., Little (1982). 
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these economies as measured by the share of exports plus imports in 
GDP (Table 10). 
Most explanations of the link between TFP growth and exports 
emphasize such static factors as improved resource allocation among 
sectors (presumably arising from reductions in anti-export bias), 
economies of scale and improved capacity utilization, which may ac- 
count for a high level of productivity being achieved after a short 
period of export orientation but not for continuing high TFP growth 
rates. However, the relationship between exports and productivity 
growth may arise from export's role in helping economies adopt and 
master international best practice. Because firms that export have greater 
access to best practice technology in imperfect world technology mar- 
kets, there are both benefits to the enterprise and spillovers to the rest 
of the economy that are not reflected in market transactions (Pack and 
Page, 1993; Bradford, 1994). These information-related externalities can 
be an important source of rapid TFP growth. 
Trade and educational strategies, moreover, may have worked to- 
gether. High levels of labor force cognitive skills permit better firm-level 
adoption, adaptation, and mastery of technology (Birdsall and Sabot, 
1993). It is doubtful that the HPAEs could have made as productive use 
of foreign knowledge and imported capital and benefited as much from 
embodiment without highly skilled domestic engineers and workers. 
Table 10 RATIO OF TOTAL TRADE TO GDP 
Economy / region 1970 1980 1985 1988 
HPAEs 
Hong Kong 1.50 1.52 1.78 2.82 
Indonesia 0.25 0.46 0.38 0.42 
Korea, Rep. of 0.32 0.63 0.66 0.66 
Japan 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.21 
Malaysia 0.89 1.00 0.85 1.09 
Singapore 2.12 3.70 2.77 3.47 
Taiwan 0.53 0.95 0.82 0.90 
Thailand 0.28 0.49 0.44 0.35 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.24 0.30 0.27 0.45 
South Asia 0.11 0.17 0.16 0.19 
Latin America and 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.23 
Caribbean 
Note: Total trade = value of exports and value of imports/gross domestic product. 
Sources: World Bank data; Taiwan, various issues; National Accounts Statistics: Analysis of Main 
Aggregates, 1988-1989 (United Nations). 
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Thus, exports and human capital formation may have interacted to 
provide a particularly rapid phase of productivity-based catch-up. 
To test the hypothesis that export orientation played a significant role 
in the HPAEs' TFP growth, we attempt to explain variations across 
economies in TFP growth rates in terms of relative income, educational 
attainment (as measured by the average stock of education per person), 
a measure of trade orientation, and measures of manufactured export 
performance (Table 11). 
The relative level of GDP in 1960 is included in the explanatory 
regression to test for the presence of conditional, productivity-based 
catch-up. The interpretation of the variable is not straightforward, 
however, since it also captures the resource allocation gains arising 
from structural transformation at low levels of income. Because these 
potential gains decline with increases in per capita income, the relative 
income variable also captures the effect of structural change on the 
one-sector TFP estimates (Pack, 1993). 
Numerous efforts have been made to test the relationship between 
"outward orientation" and productivity growth.35 Dollar (1990) uses 
the international comparisons of price levels compiled for 121 market 
countries by Summers and Heston (1988) to develop an index of 
"outward orientation" for 95 developing countries. We employ Dollar's 
index in our basic specification and find that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between "outward orientation" and TFP growth. 
The interpretation of this variable is also not straightforward, how- 
ever. Rodrik (1993) has discussed the problems in the construction of 
the index and its interpretation, and argues that it is best regarded as an 
index of exchange rate mismanagement. To the extent that this is 
correct, our results differ from those of Fischer (1993) in finding a 
significant negative relationship between inappropriate exchange rate 
policy and productivity growth. 
Manufactured export performance is strongly correlated (at the 1% 
level) with increased rates of TFP growth. We use two measures of 
export orientation that have somewhat different interpretations. The 
first is the share of manufactured exports in total exports. This is a 
crude measure of the probability that the marginal export will be a 
manufactured good. The second is the more conventional share of 
manufactured exports in GDP, which measures manufactured export 
concentration for the economy. Both the share of manufactured exports 
in total exports and the share of manufactured exports in GDP are 
35. See, e.g., Thomas and Wang (1993) and Nishimizu and Page (1991). 
Table 11 DETERMINANTS OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, 1960-1989 
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RATE OF GROWTH OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1960-1989) 
Number of observations 56 62 47 47 64 49 49 
Intercept 
GDP relative to U.S., 1960 
Educational attainment, 1960 
Dollar index 
Average manufactured exports/ 
total exports, 1960-1985 
Interaction term: Education attainment 
1960 times manufactured exports 
/total exports, 1960-1985 
Average manufactured exports/GDP, 
1965-1985 
Interaction term: Education attainment 
1960 times manufactured exports/ 
GDP, 1965-1985 
Adjusted R2 
- 83.1863** - 0.3584 -64.9123** -71.1186** -0.1315 -72.0692** -70.8604** 
(15.6575) 
- 4.5638* 
(2.1994) 
0.3083** 
(0.0951) 
0.8328** 
(0.1579) 
(0.2614) (14.0585) 
- 3.3864** - 4.8047* 
(1.0189) (1.9771) 
0.2158** 0.1471 
(0.0808) (0.0874) 
0.6493** 
(0.1417) 
0.0345** 0.0314** 
(0.0058) (0.0066) 
(14.8657) 
- 5.5757** 
(2.0637) 
0.0680 
(0.1082) 
0.7154** 
(0.1508) 
0.0159 
(0.0142) 
0.0032 
(0.0026) 
0.0828** 0.0625* 
(0.0279) (0.0269) 
0.4854 0.4665 0.6333 0.6376 0.1950 0.4507 0.4628 
* 
Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Note: Coefficient is top number. Standard error is bottom number in parentheses. 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
(0.3244) 
- 1.4501 
(1.1912) 
0.2269* 
(0.0990) 
(15.6104) 
- 2.3509 
(2.3225) 
0.1574 
(0.1064) 
0.7225** 
(0.1574) 
(15.4608) 
-2.1562 
(2.3008) 
0.0738 
(0.1207) 
0.7134** 
(0.1558) 
-0.0686 
(0.0966) 
0.0284 
(0.0201) 
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significantly and positively correlated with TFP growth, controlling for 
relative income and educational attainment.36 
When the manufactured export variables are introduced together 
with the Dollar index, both are significant, although the coefficient on 
the share of manufactured exports in total output is less precisely 
estimated. Our interpretation of these results is that controlling for 
overall "outward orientation" (or appropriate exchange rate policy), 
high manufactured export orientation increases TFP growth. A high 
concentration of manufactured exports relative to total exports, rather 
than the relative size of the manufactured export sector, is more closely 
associated with productivity growth in a cross-economy framework. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that export-based learning is 
more closely related to manufactured export orientation than to manu- 
factured export volume. 
The education stock variable is included as a crude test of education- 
ally based externalities. We find, consistent with this hypothesis, that 
the education stock variable is positively and significantly associated 
with TFP growth when either the Dollar index of outward orientation 
or either index of manufactured export orientation is used indepen- 
dently in the regressions. When both indices of outward orientation are 
introduced jointly, however, the magnitude of the coefficient on educa- 
tional attainment declines, as does its significance (to the .10 level). This 
is suggestive of an interaction between trade orientation and educa- 
tional attainment. 
We also find some evidence of a positive interaction between the 
share of manufactured exports in total exports and in national income 
and the stock of education. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between these two variables is positive but not significant at conven- 
tional levels, and the export share variable becomes insignificant. When 
we consider the contribution of the variables taken together to explain- 
ing the variation in TFP growth rates, however, it is statistically posi- 
tive. We conclude that export performance and education interact 
36. The evidence from our cross-economy estimates is supported by a number of recent 
microeconomic studies that attempt to test the link between exports and productivity 
growth. Pack and Page (1993) present evidence from Korea and Taiwan that at the 
sectoral level, rapid export growth is correlated with the pattern of productivity 
change; exporting sectors have higher sectoral rates of TFP growth. Wei (1993) uses 
city level data from China and finds a statistically significant relationship between 
export growth and productivity growth. Aw and Hwang (1993), using firm-level 
microeconomic data from Taiwan, find a statistically significant relationship between 
productivity level differences among manufacturing firms and export orientation. 
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positively; higher levels of education raise the contribution of manufac- 
tured export concentration to TFP growth.37 
4.2 THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Proponents of neutrality and intervention both cite the high perform- 
ing East Asian economies as evidence supporting their views. Balassa 
(1991), Krueger (1993), Hughes (1992), and others argue that openness 
to international trade, based on largely neutral incentives, was the 
critical factor in East Asia's rapid growth. On the other hand, advocates 
of interventions, while acknowledging the importance of trade, note 
that incentives deriving from quantitative restrictions on imports, tariffs, 
and subsidies were not neutral among sectors (or firms) during the 
HPAEs' periods of rapid growth. They argue that the HPAE govern- 
ments successfully intervened to change comparative advantage 
(Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Singh, 1992). 
Industrial policy interventions, which often use trade policy instru- 
ments, are motivated by the belief that shifting industrial structures 
toward newer and more modern sectors increases the opportunities for 
capturing the dynamic scale economies that result from learning. We 
define industrial policies, as distinct from trade policies, as government 
efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity-based 
growth. This productivity-based growth may derive from learning, 
technological innovation, or catch-up to international best practice. 
All of the HPAEs, except Hong Kong, have employed industrial 
policies as defined earlier. Japan and Korea had the most systematic set 
of policies to alter industrial structure. Taiwan's efforts were less sys- 
tematic but were nonetheless widespread. Industrial policy in Singa- 
pore was more functionally directed at the rapid upgrading of technol- 
ogy by direct foreign investors, regardless of type of output. Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and Thailand have all used industrial policies but much less 
systematically than the northeastern HPAEs. 
37. We ran two joint F tests on the regressions including the interactive term. The F tests 
were both consistent with a high degree of multicollinearity between the interaction 
term and the export term. The F Test rejects the null hypothesis that, taken jointly, 
the coefficients on the three variables (education, manufactured exports/total exports, 
and the interactive term) are not significantly different from zero (taken together, the 
three are significantly different from zero at the .01 level). Likewise, the F test rejects 
the hypothesis that, taken jointly, the interactive term and the export variable are not 
significantly different from zero (taken together, the two are significantly different 
from zero at the .01 level). Where there is a high degree of multicollinearity between 
the variables, the coefficients on the interaction term and the export variable, despite 
being separately insignificant, should still be treated as best point estimates. 
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Table 12 EFFECT OF SECTORAL COMPOSITION ON MANUFACTURING 
WIDE GROWTH OF TFP 
TFP growth, TFP growth, 
Economy actual value added weights adjusted weights 
Korea, Rep. of, 1966-1985 6.7 6.1 
Japan, 1960-1979 2.3 1.9 
Note: Weighted by value added shares that would have prevailed if the metal products and 
machinery sector had conformed to that predicted by the equations estimated by Syrquin and 
Chenery (1989). 
Sources: Pack (1993). Based on Kuroda, Korgenson, and Nizhimizu (1985) for TFP estimates for 
Japan. 
4.2.1 Industrial Growth and Productivity Change HPAE industrial growth 
patterns differ from the patterns in most other low- and middle-income 
economies in the relative size and growth rates of two important 
industrial subsectors-metal products, electronics and machinery, and 
textiles and garments. Table 12 shows the ratio of the share of the value 
added in five key International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
subsectors as a percentage of the total value added of manufacturing to 
cross-country norms (Chenery, 1987). Among the HPAEs, metal prod- 
ucts, electronics, and machinery (ISIC subsector 38, or MPM) have 
grown unusually fast. The sector's share of manufacturing value added 
doubled in Singapore and Japan, nearly tripled in Korea, and Indone- 
sia, and quadrupled in Malaysia. More surprising than the importance 
of growth in MPM, which provides vital inputs to numerous other 
manufacturing subsectors, is continued importance of textiles and gar- 
ments even as the rapidly developing Asian economies shifted from 
labor intensive to capital intensive production. 
Detailed sectoral growth rates of TFP are available for Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan. There is both good news and bad news for advocates of 
industrial policy in the productivity performance of East Asian industry. 
The good news is that, on average, rates of productivity change in 
industry in Japan (before 1973), Korea, and Taiwan, which are the only 
economies for which we have detailed sectoral estimates of TFP growth, 
were high by international standards (Page, 1990).38 There are now 
sufficiently long time series data to conclude that in these economies, 
TFP growth has accounted for a substantial fraction of the growth of 
38. Young (1993) disputes even this assertion, although his sample of LDC comparators is 
small. 
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constant price value added in manufacturing. Given the length of time 
of the observations, it seems unlikely that the measured growth rates of 
TFP could be attributable to cyclical phenomena or growing capacity 
utilization of initial large investments. 
The bad news is that, in general, productivity change has not been 
higher in promoted sectors. Japan may be an exception. Between 1960 
and 1979, chemicals and the metal working machinery complex had 
unusually good TFP performance (Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu, 
1987). Japan's industrial structure differs from international norms in 
these sectors and exhibits quite high values of the share of value added 
in total manufacturing. These industries are those that observers usually 
point to as having received significant government support including 
efforts to stimulate productivity growth. 
A number of calculations of TFP have been carried out for Korea for a 
variety of periods (Dollar and Sokoloff, 1990; Lim, 1991). From these 
studies a number of patterns can be identified that are broadly consis- 
tent with one another. What is most striking are the high values of TFP 
change in most sectors by international standards (Nishimizu and Page, 
1991). Although the Korean government selectively promoted chemicals 
and iron and steel (included in basic metals), the large growth in the 
share of iron and steel was accompanied by quite low TFP performance 
between 1966 and 1985; textiles and clothing, on the other hand, had 
very high rates of TFP growth. The promoted chemical sector, whose 
relative size was decreasing, was characterized by considerably higher 
than average TFP growth during this same period. 
The government in Taiwan did not attempt to influence sectoral 
evolution as strongly as the government of Korea. Nevertheless, there 
was substantial effort devoted to encouraging specific sectors, particu- 
larly those viewed as either capital- or technology-intensive. However, 
there is no relationship between capital intensity and productivity 
change at the sectoral level. In fact, the highest sectoral rates of TFP 
change are recorded in textiles and apparel. 
Overall, the evidence that industrial policy systematically promoted 
sectors with high productivity change is weak. In Japan there is some 
support for the assertion that TFP growth was higher in selected 
sectors, while in Korea and Taiwan, activities that were not promoted 
(e.g., textiles) had equally as impressive TFP performances as those that 
were. The critical empirical question, of course, is whether, given any 
plausible assumptions regarding the relative size of promoted sectors in 
the absence of industrial policy and their observed rates of productivity 
change, industrial policies accelerate the overall rate of productivity 
change in manufacturing. 
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4.2.2 The Effect of Industrial Policy on Manufacturing Productivity Growth 
Aggregate TFP in any period can be decomposed by weighing each 
sector's level of total factor productivity, A, t, by the sector's share in 
value added, vi,t. The growth of TFP will then depend on changes in 
A, t and changes in vi, . Algebraically, this relation can be written as 
A Log A = (vit log Ai, t - i, t-_ log Ai, t-1). (3) 
Equation (3) gives the growth in A due to the change in productivity of 
sectors assuming constant sectoral shares and/or the growth in the 
value added share of sectors, whose productivity is high. 
Of the countries considered here, Japan and Korea are the countries 
in which activist industrial policies were employed most consistently to 
achieve productivity-based catch-up. On the basis of international com- 
parisons, two sectors were generally overrepresented in the industrial 
sectors of the HPAEs, metal products and machinery, and textiles and 
apparel. Broadly speaking, only the former sector was promoted in 
HPAEs that used industrial policy. One test of the significance of 
industrial policy, then, is whether, given the observed values of sectoral 
TFP growth, the unusual evolution of the sectoral pattern of production 
in some of the countries had a significant quantitative impact on overall 
TFP growth.39 
To answer this we first calculate the manufacturing-wide growth of 
A* using the observed value-added shares at the end of the period of 
1966 to 1985, and the A* values estimated for Korea by Lim (1991) and 
for Japan by Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987). We then recalcu- 
late the value added weights assuming that the sectors in ISIC 38 had 
been at their predicted value, on the basis of international norms taken 
from Chenery (1986), and we reassign the residual value added to all 
other sectors equally. Thus, in Korea, instead of accounting for 38% of 
manufacturing value added, sector 38 accounts for 14%.40 
The result for Korea is shown in row 1 in Table 12. The actual sector- 
wide growth rate, A*, was 6.7%, the recalculated one 6.1%, during a 
39. It is possible that industrial policy significantly increased the values of A* in sectors 
other than those promoted due to one or more externalities. While this may be the 
case, it is likely that most externalities occur within individual sectors or in closely 
related ones. Given the many branches constituting the Metal Products and Machin- 
ery sector, the externalities should have been revealed in its own TFP value. 
40. Put differently, it has been shown earlier that Korea's vP/vA ratio for MPP was 2.76. 
If this had been one, the actual share of value added would have been 13% rather 
than 36%, i.e., the share would have been constant at the 1968 level. If factors had 
been allocated to all of the remaining sectors equally, the sector-wide average value for A* would have been .061 rather than .067. 
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period in which the growth rate of manufacturing value added was 
17.5% per annum. Even if the "excess" growth of the MPM sector is 
attributed to selective intervention, its rate of TFP growth was not 
sufficiently above that of other sectors to make a large contribution to 
overall industrial TFP growth. The major reason for Korea's manufac- 
turing success lay in high individual TFP growth rates for most sectors 
in most periods. A calculation, similar to that for Korea can be done for 
Japan. Table 12 shows the actual growth of A* for 1960-1979 and the 
estimated growth, had the sectors constituting 38 been at the interna- 
tional norm, 24% of manufacturing value added rather than 41% in 
1979. The value of A* would have declined from 2.3 to 1.9, a relatively 
small decrease given the growth rate of manufacturing value added of 
8.7% per annum. 
5. Policies for Rapid Growth in a Changing 
World Economy 
What caused East Asia's success? In large measure the HPAEs achieved 
high growth by getting the basics right. Private domestic investment, 
combined with rapidly growing human capital, were the principal 
engines of growth. Agriculture, while declining in relative importance, 
experienced rapid growth and productivity change. Population growth 
rates declined more rapidly in the HPAEs than in other parts of the 
developing world. And some of these economies also benefited from a 
head start in terms of the education of the labor force and capable and 
effective systems of public administration. In this sense there is little 
that is "miraculous" about the HPAEs' superior record of growth; it is 
largely due to superior accumulation. 
To what extent are those lessons from East Asia applicable to other 
developing economies? In the HPAEs, a wide variety of policies, across 
countries and over time within countries, were used to achieve the 
critical functions of growth: accumulation, allocation, and productivity 
growth. While the sheer variety of policies precludes drawing any 
simple lessons or making any simple recommendations, two fundamen- 
talist lessons can be drawn. Macroeconomic stability and the capacity to 
respond effectively to macroeconomic shocks helped to accelerate 
growth through all three mechanisms, increasing accumulation, im- 
proving resource allocation, and increasing productivity growth. Educa- 
tion policies that stressed broadly based primary and secondary 
education contributed directly to output growth and apparently also 
indirectly through the interaction of educational shocks and export 
orientation to TFP growth. 
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Our judgment was that the promotion of specific individual indus- 
tries made relatively little difference to the HPAEs' success. Rather, 
export push strategies have been the most generally successful selective 
approach used by the HPAEs and hold the greatest promise for other 
developing economies. It is not altogether surprising that we conclude 
that export orientation rather than industrial policy was mainly respon- 
sible for improving productivity growth in Japan and Korea. These 
economies, although selectively promoting capital and knowledge in- 
tensive industries, still aimed at creating profitable, internationally com- 
petitive firms. The yardstick used to evaluate industrial policies success 
-mainly export performance-provided a market test of the success or 
failure of the policy instruments chosen. Picking winners may have 
succeeded more because Japan and Korea set export targets for pro- 
moted industries and used export performance to assess the success of 
policies than because of success in selecting industrial subsectors. 
Despite their potential benefits, selective interventions, especially 
when combined with access to scarce resources such as foreign ex- 
change and credit, have a high risk of capture by the participants. 
Capture was avoided-and resource allocation may have been im- 
proved-in Japan and Korea by the combination of repeated relation- 
ships between business and government and the use of exports, not 
domestic GDP growth, as the yardstick by which the success of the 
industrial strategy was measured. In other HPAEs, however, such 
elaborate contests were not used-e.g., in Hong Kong, Singapore, or 
Taiwan-or were unsuccessful, as in the cases of the HICOM drive in 
Malaysia or recent efforts at technological leapfrogging in Indonesia. 
In the HPAEs that intervened selectively to promote exports, a 
contest based on performance in global markets played the allocative 
role that is normally ascribed to neutral exposure of both import 
substituting and exporting industries to international competition. But 
these contest-based incentive structures required high government in- 
stitutional capability. One of the keys to success of the export push in 
some of the HPAEs, especially Japan and Korea, was the government's 
ability to combine cooperation with competition. They were able to do 
this first, because their civil services and public institutions were largely 
staffed by competent and honest civil servants, and second, because 
firms and bureaucrats knew that there was a single yardstick for 
performance, exports. 
Export targets provided a consistent yardstick to measure the success 
of market interventions. When protected sectors interfered with the 
exports of other sectors, the latter could seek redress and were success- 
ful. Even where domestic content rules were imposed, e.g., on foreign 
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direct investors in Taiwan, they were suspended if they interfered with 
exports. The emphasis on export competitiveness gave businesses and 
bureaucrats a transparent and objective system to gauge the desirability 
of specific actions. Interventions could not be made arbitrarily, because 
these could be appealed at a higher level of government if they 
interfered with exports. The more recent export push efforts of the 
Southeast Asian NIEs have relied less on highly specific incentives and 
more on gradual reductions in import protection, coupled with institu- 
tional support of exporters and a duty-free regime for inputs into 
exports. These "GATT friendly" export promotion strategies offer sub- 
stantial scope for adoption by other developing economies. 
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Comment 
SUSAN M. COLLINS 
Georgetown University, The Brookings Institution, and NBER 
This provocative paper reexamines the experiences of the East Asian 
miracle economies (so-called because of their remarkable growth perfor- 
mances). One relatively noncontroversial section of the paper provides 
further evidence in support of two conventional conclusions-that 
sound macroeconomic management as well as broad-based educational 
policies played important roles in the impressive performances. The 
provocative part of the paper focuses on the role of micro-management, 
concluding that while export promotion did contribute to high growth, 
the targeted industrial policies many of the countries employed did not. 
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Unfortunately, I am not convinced that the methodology used here 
supports the author's conclusions. In my view, the jury is still out as to 
the lessons East Asian economies teach about the merits of micro 
interventions. 
Before discussing the specifics of the paper, let me make two points. 
First, the paper addresses very important issues that it is helpful to put 
in context. There is a long-standing debate about the role that govern- 
ment intervention has played in high-performing Asian economies 
(HPAEs). This study comes out of a major World Bank project to assess 
the development strategy in East Asia and draw lessons for other 
countries with poor growth histories. In particular, was there a reason 
to amend the traditional World Bank view that such intervention is 
harmful? Thus, the present paper and the larger World Bank study 
seem to represent a qualitative change in World Bank doctrine, which 
now allows a limited role for micro-management as part of a sensible 
development strategy. In my view, this more balanced "conventional 
wisdom" is warranted and appropriate. 
Second, based on my own knowledge of the Korean experience, I am 
quite sympathetic to the view that the extensive interventions have 
helped to foster growth in East Asia-in fact, I believe that this view is 
probably correct. My critique of this paper should be taken as an 
assessment of the specific approach and conclusions presented here, 
and not as an outgrowth of my priors about the role of intervention. 
Let me now return to the specifics of the paper, roughly in the order 
of presentation. The first part of the paper is devoted to documenting 
the experience of rapid growth among HPAEs and to examining alter- 
native explanations for it. The author divides the views into two camps: 
fundamentalists-who stress the role of factor accumulation and tend 
to believe that markets worked well-versus mystics-who focus on 
the role of technology and tend to believe that activist government 
policies helped to remedy market failures. The author's analysis of the 
data leads him to conclude that "the East Asian success story is, then, 
primarily a fundamentalist one." 
The analysis presented does not really allow one to distinguish 
between the two views. It seems to me that the approach is likely to 
underestimate the role of technology, making it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions-if the objective is to debunk the mystic view, surely one 
would like to know the maximum amount that technology could 
reasonably contribute to growth. The paper estimates total factor pro- 
ductivity (TFP) for HPAEs under the assumption that they all have the 
same production function as industrial countries. It seems more reason- 
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able to assume that their production functions were converging toward 
the function for industrial countries. In fact, the paper tells us that the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital is much larger for the 
industrial country sample than for the full sample including the devel- 
oping countries. This suggests that the methodology overstates the 
contribution of capital accumulation to growth in the developing coun- 
try HPAEs, thus understating the contribution of TFP. However, it is 
difficult to tell how large the underestimate might be. 
It is also difficult to draw strong conclusions from the evidence about 
factor accumulation here. To study the role of accumulation, the paper 
presents scatter plots of average income growth, investment rates, and 
education indicators during 1960-1985 each relative to 1960 per capita 
incomes for HPAEs and a group of comparator countries. Although the 
HPAEs are outliers in terms of their growth rates, it is much less 
obvious that they are outliers in terms of investment and education. 
One problem is that these very aggregate measures of factor accumula- 
tion may mask important differences among countries. Further, the 
method seems quite sensitive to time period. For example, Korea had 
very low investment rates (12.1% of GDP) during 1960-1965 versus 
27.2% during 1965-1985. If the period selected began in 1965, Korea 
might be an "outlier" in terms of both growth and investment rates. I 
also note that Denison-style growth decompositions do point to the 
importance of factor accumulation in Korea. Kim and Park (1985)1 find 
that increases in factor inputs contributed substantially to growth in 
Korea during 1963-1982 (4.9% per annum). 
It seems to me that both accumulation and technological progress 
have been important-as a group, the HPAEs stand out because they 
have tended to do well in both. (Of course, there are differences across 
countries.) Perhaps the fundamentalist-mystic debate creates a false 
dichotomy. Technical progress and accumulation appear to interact in 
complex but difficult to measure ways, and we may learn a considerable 
amount by studying this interaction. 
The next section of the paper reaffirms two conventional lessons, 
both of which I agree with strongly. I mention these lessons only 
briefly. First, sound macroeconomic management produced a stable 
environment for economic activity to flourish. In fact, over the past 
decade, there has been a striking convergence of views about the 
1. See Kim, K. S., and J. K. Park. (1985). Sources of economic growth in Korea: 1963-82. Seoul, 
Korea: Korea Development Institute, pp. 67-69. 
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importance of small budget deficits, monetary control, and realistic 
exchange rates. The experiences of these high-growth economies have 
played a role in the development of this consensus. At the same time, 
the paper does not address the political economy of how and why 
these economies were able to initiate, implement, and follow through 
on sound macroeconomic policies.2 
Second, the paper emphasizes the role of broad-based education 
systems. Here, I wonder if the point could have been made even more 
strongly if data on private spending on education had been included 
along with the public expenditure figures. In many Asian economies a 
strikingly large fraction of disposable household income is devoted to 
tutors and other additional education expenditures for children. In 
addition, the paper notes that the share of national income devoted to 
education during both 1960 and 1989 in HPAEs is similar to the share in 
comparator countries. This is a little misleading, because the HPAEs 
have had a dramatic decline in dependency rates between 1960 and 
1989-hence, the rise in per pupil expenditures. 
The last part of the paper draws two "unconventional" conclusions: 
that the promotion of manufactured exports was a significant source of 
measured TFP change, while industrial policies mattered little. In the 
remainder of my remarks, I explain why the jury is still out on the 
effects of these types of policies. 
To study export promotion, the paper presents a cross-country re- 
gression of average TFP growth on the ratio of manufactured to total 
exports, a measure of "openness" and other right-hand-side variables. 
The export ratio and openness are found to be significant. However, 
what does this tell us about the effects of active interventionism that 
promoted certain types of exports through direct credit allocations and 
other forms of micro management? The export ratio is partially a 
structural variable that depends on endowments as well as on policy. 
Further, as the paper notes, the measure of openness used is typically 
described as a measure of sensible exchange rate management. Perhaps 
this variable is simply picking up the importance of sound macroeco- 
nomic policy-a "conventional" lesson. 
To study industrial policy, the paper compares TFP growth across 
two-digit industries within countries. It finds that although the average 
2. For example, see Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman (eds.). (1992). The politics of economic 
adjustment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; and Williamson, J. (ed.). (1994). 
The political economy of policy reform. Washington, DC: Institute for International Eco- 
nomics. 
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TFP is high among HPAEs, it does not appear to be relatively higher in 
certain promoted sectors than in nonpromoted ones. However, it is not 
clear that the promoted/nonpromoted distinction is made appropri- 
ately. For instance, textiles and garments are taken to be a sector that 
was not promoted, even though Korea promoted it during part of the 
period under consideration. Further, perhaps a successful industrial 
policy works by raising average sectoral productivity and reducing the 
variation in productivity growth across sectors. This finding may be 
quite consistent with an effective intervention strategy. 
There are three additional problems with this analysis-as well as the 
concern expressed earlier about how TFP is measured. First, the at- 
tempted distinction between export promotion and industrial policy is 
strange. Industrial policies are defined as "distinct from trade policies, 
government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity 
based growth." How would the author classify selective credit alloca- 
tions to firms producing color televisions that helped to increase their 
productivity and their exports? Surely such an intervention should 
count as both industrial policy and export promotion! 
Second, there is the problem of the "appropriate counterfactual." It is 
not at all clear that other countries (with a variety of different character- 
istics) are the appropriate benchmark against which to measure the 
implications of a given country's attempt to promote a particular group 
of exports. Also, as already discussed, "good" industrial policy may 
work to reduce differences in cross-sectoral productivity instead of 
increasing them. These issues warranted considerably more discussion 
in the paper. A clearer analytic framework that spelled out the channels 
through which export promotion and industrial policies are expected to 
work would have helped in this regard. 
Finally, the methodology tries to look for broad generalizations, 
when surely the HPAE and other experiences suggest that some types 
of interventions work under some conditions. Thus, it would be instruc- 
tive to focus our research on trying to understand better when particu- 
lar types of interventions are most likely to work well, and when 
poorly. For example, does sector matter-is it easier to succeed in 
promoting certain types of industries? When are direct credit alloca- 
tions riskier than tax-based incentives? 
Overall, this paper has reinforced my view that sound macroeco- 
nomic policies and educational emphasis promote growth. However, it 
has not altered my view that while the upside potential from an activist 
intervention strategy appears to be high, the down-side risk appears to 
be even more considerable. 
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Comment 
TAKATOSHI ITO 
Harvard University and NBER 
This paper presents Dr. Page's view on how rapid economic growth 
occurred in the eight East Asian countries-Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. His knowledge 
and analyses are mainly based on a grand research study conducted at 
the World Bank (1993).1 The study at the World Bank is considered to 
be an overture to second thoughts on its development assistant strat- 
egy. The value and virtue of government intervention, such as policy 
loans (subsidized loan to targeted industries), is at the heart of the 
controversy. This paper succinctly summarizes major debate points in 
the literature of East Asian growth experience. My comments follow the 
presentation of Page's paper. 
1. Rapid Growth and Its Source 
No one disagrees that growth experiences in the eight East Asian 
countries were miraculous. All of the eight countries have recorded 
growth in GDP per capita exceeding 4% a year, especially the "Four 
Tigers" exceeding 6% a year from 1965 to 1989. This presents "outliers" 
in the so-called convergence regression. Figure 1 of the paper clearly 
shows that these East Asian countries are outliers in the regression of 
growth on the initial level of income. Theory predicts that low-income 
countries tend to grow faster so that "convergence" in the level of 
income among countries in the world will occur. Of course growth 
depends on accumulation of labor, capital, and technology. Even adjust- 
ing for those factors, i.e., basically looking at TFP growth such as in 
Tables 1 and 2, the TFP growth experience is impressive for most, not 
all, of the eight countries. 
I have reservations on this way of introducing a "miracle" and set up 
the following analysis, as many papers do by now. As a student of "old 
growth theory," I tend to distinguish a growth process, which is a 
I am indebted to Anne O. Krueger and David Weil for their helpful comments on the 
preceding version of this comments. 
1. The World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle, has already been widely reviewed. 
Rodrik (1993) challenges some of its assertions, especially links between hypotheses 
and regression results. Amsden (1993) criticized the half-hearted appreciation of gov- 
ernment interventions and industrial policy. 
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process of quantity changes, from economic development, which is 
more about quality changes. My objection to a convergence regression 
is that it ignores the nonlinear process, or qualitative change, of eco- 
nomic development.2 
Simon Kuznets observed that when a country starts on a sustainable 
growth path, qualitative changes have to occur. Investment grows 
sharply, industrial structures change, and growth results with social 
changes. Britain led the industrial revolution and modern economic 
growth in the mid-18th century, followed by France, the United States, 
and Germany in the first half of the 19th century. Many European 
countries started rapid economic growth between 1860 and 1870, ac- 
cording to Kuznets. Kuznets (1959) coined the phrase "modern eco- 
nomic growth," listing some common features: (1) the application of 
modern scientific thought and technology to industry; (2) a sustained 
and rapid increase in real product per capita, usually (but not always) 
accompanied by a high rate of population growth; (3) a rapid transfor- 
mation of the industrial structure (changing sectoral output, labor force, 
and capital stock distribution); and (4) an expansion of international 
contacts. Kuznets, by the way, dates the start of modern economic 
growth of Japan at around 1874 and 1879. 
Was it also a "miracle" to have seen the European countries experi- 
ence rapid economic growth around the turn of century? If Kuznets 
dates modern economic growth for Asia in the year 2020, the date for 
the Four Tigers would be sometime around 1960 and the ASEAN four 
around 1970. Wouldn't it be more heuristic to compare East Asian 
experiences not with the current developing nations but with the 
European industrial revolution? Of course, Korea in 1960 faced quite 
different economic conditions from Britain in 1780. However, the kind 
of change in industrial structures, work habits, saving behavior, and 
other social changes may be similar. 
This is more than just a philosophical point. Consider the Solow 
diagram of (Y/L) on (K/L). Depending on the shape of the production 
function, there may be many steady states. Let us suppose that there 
are two stable equilibria, the low, k*, and the high, k**, with an 
intermediate, unstable steady state, kc. If a country can make a jump (in 
a matter of a decade) from k* to somewhere above kc, the critical value, 
then the "convergence" logic works. But an interesting part is not the 
convergence process between kC and k**, but an initial jump from k* 
to above kc. Is the jump a miracle or a big push? 
2. The following argument is a summary of my previous comments on a convergence 
paper by Easterly (1994); see Ito (1994). 
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I consider that it is more interesting to see what causes the jump from 
a low equilibrium (vicious circle) onto a path toward a high equilibrium. 
Once high investment kicks in, growth results, and growth fosters 
confidence in the country and high savings result, which connects to 
investment, a virtuous circle.3 
Many countries made a jump or a takeoff to a high-growth path in 
different times. We may be witnessing a group of countries taking off 
from Asia. A benchmark to be compared should be the earlier develop- 
ment experiences by European countries, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan in different times, rather than contemporary devel- 
oping countries. 
If this version of Kuznets's view of the world is accepted, then the 
regular convergence regression does not make sense. At best, it is 
misspecified in that it mixes up three groups of countries: one large 
group of countries that are yet to take off-low level of incomes with 
low rates of growth; a group of OECD countries-a high level of 
income with a low rate of growth; and a small group of countries that 
are in the process of catching up-high-growth rates with a low- to 
middle-income level, i.e., "converging." What a convergence regression 
attempts to capture is the third group of countries. 
2. Common Denominators of Success 
The paper lists common denominators among the eight countries. First, 
the paper observes that the growth experience was accompanied by 
relative income equity. Then, four keys for success are explained: (1) 
maintaining macroeconomic stability, (2) broad-based educational 
strategies, (3) export growth, and (4) insignificance of industrial policy. 
The first two are called "conventional," while the latter two are called 
"unconventional." Obviously, few disagree with the conventional wis- 
dom, and I make only passing remarks. I will make more extensive 
comments on the unconventional ones, (3) and (4). 
It is obvious that macroeconomic stability is important for growth. 
But macroeconomic stability is easy to achieve when growth is high, a 
possibility of reverse causality.4 When income is growing faster than 
3. This is a simple argument of low- and high-income multiple equilibria in the frame- 
work of the Solow model. I certainly do not claim this argument to be particularly 
original. Professor James Tobin pointed out to me during the conference that similar 
points were made by Richard R. Nelson (1956, 1960). 
4. In 1960, Japanese political power was paralyzed over the new security treaty with the 
United States. A new 10-year plan "to double income" was proposed by a new prime 
minister, Hayato Ikeda, to heal the wounds between the political right and left. Growth 
as a national target was used to achieve political and macroeconomic stability. See Ito 
(1992, pp. 61-67) for macroeconomic planning. 
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expected, tax revenue will be higher to help fiscal balance, and inflation 
is easier to control. 
Education is important. Usually, primary and secondary enrollment 
rates or public expenditure on education, as in Tables 7 and 8 of this 
paper, are used to show the evidence on high human capital accumula- 
tion.5 These variables are admittedly proxies. What is learned in an 
education system, from knowledge accumulation to group conducts, as 
well as education at home, may be more important in growth. But they 
are hard to measure. 
3. Sequencing as Industrial Policy 
The paper argues that export push was a successful strategy, while 
industrial policy was "insignificant." Exports have enhanced growth, 
while trying to pick particular industries has not been successful. The 
former assertion was supported by high correlations between some 
measures of openness and exports, including the admittedly controver- 
sial Dollar index, and growth. The latter assertion was supported 
mainly by evidence that TFP growth in promoted sectors in Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan were not particularly high, and promotion of partic- 
ular industries did not change overall growth, compared with what it 
would have been without intervention. 
In discussing industrial policy, I will challenge the paper from two 
aspects: What is important in industrial policy is "sequencing," which is 
not discussed in the paper. 
Sequencing of the leading industries in the economy is considered to 
be a key to growth, according to an oral tradition of East Asian 
countries.6 For example, industrial policy in Japan has been centered 
around promoting industry after industry: textiles and toys, steel, chem- 
icals, shipbuildings, to high-tech industries. Due to required sophistica- 
tion in technology and large fixed costs, the government was aware of 
the importance of sequencing industries. The developed "light and 
low-tech" industries make a platform for a jump to the next stage, 
"mid-tech" industries. A jump to "high tech" is only appropriate after a 
5. Rodrik (1993) pointed out that growth can be explained by the "initial" condition of 
high education levels and equity in income and land distributions, without using the 
investment/GDP ratio that Rodrik correctly points out as "endogenous." 6. A broad concept of sequencing in economic development is often called a "flying geese 
pattern" in the Japanese literature. Originally, the flying geese pattern was named after 
the pattern of import substitution to export substitution, in one industry after another. 
Later, it is directed to a pattern of regional countries' development sequencing; the 
leader, Japan, is followed by Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and they in 
turn are followed by other ASEAN countries. 
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Japan Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore 
Textile 1900-1930 1960s Early 1950s Early 1960s 
Again 1950 1970s (dominant) Again 1970s 
Clothing, 
apparel 1950s 1960s 1950s-1960s 
1970s 
Toys, watches, 1950s 1960s 1960s-1970s 
footwares 1970s 
Refining (promo) 
Early 1960s 
Steel 1950s-1960s (promo) 
Latye 1960s- 
Early 1970s 
Chemicals 1960s-1970s Late 1960s 1970s 
Early 1970s 
Shipbuilding 1960s-1970s 1970s 
Electronics 1970s Late 1970s 1980s 1970s 
1980s 
Automobile 1970s-1980s 1980s 
Computers, 1980s Late 1980s 
semiconductors 
Banking and Late 1970s 1980s 
finance 1980s 
Source: Japan, Korea, Taiwan: author's judgment; Hong Kong, Singapore, Young (1992). 
success at the mid tech" industries. Profits and experiences-both 
management and labor-in a lower stage are key for a success in 
developing a higher stage. Too high a jump to skip a stage, just like an 
attempt to take off an airplane with too steep an angle, would result in 
a crashing failure. East Asian countries, having observed a history of 
European and U.S. economic history, have repeated the same process, 
but faster.7 
The table that appears in this Comment shows an experience among 
East Asian countries of such sequencing. 
If sequencing is important, then four implications follow. First, it is 
not a "miracle" to observe takeoff in Asia. It is just repeating what 
Europe did a century ago. (This is also pointed out in the first part of 
these comments.) Second, when repeating a history, it is easy to predict 
which industry comes next, hence "picking a sunrise industry" is not as 
7. See Ito (1992, Chapter 2) for elaboration on economic takeoff and sequencing. Ito (1992, 
Chapter 2, footnote 18) invokes an analogy to a biological idea that "ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny." 
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risky as it is often claimed. Many Japanese economists argue that 
promoting particular industries in the 1950s and 1960s was theoretically 
possible and successful, but it became impossible and undesirable to 
pick winners in the 1980s, as the economy became more "mature." 
Third, showing low TFPs in "promoted sectors" cannot be used as 
evidence for a failure of industrial policy. If industrial policy made it 
possible to run up the stages faster, it is a success even without realizing 
high TFPs in each stage.8 
Fourth, showing that the composition of industries in Japan and 
Korea is not different from the theoretical prediction (Table 12 of Page's 
paper) cannot be taken as evidence of the irrelevance of industrial 
policy. Even if the composition after intervention is the same as the 
composition predicted from theory, the success is getting there fast. 
4. Regional Secret? 
However, the puzzle still remains. If an initial push can be done 
anywhere in the world, one should observe high growth taking place 
randomly on the globe. This is not the case. The 19th-century growth 
was concentrated in Europe and North America (with an exception of 
Australia and Japan), while the late 20th-century growth is happening 
in Asia. Certainly geographical proximity plays an important role. 
Technological transfers, worker mobility, trade links, and political peer 
pressure may be important factors in regional development. It hap- 
pened in Asia in the 1980s. Maybe another "miracle" will occur some- 
where else in the 2000s. 
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Discussion 
Page responded to several points raised by Collins and by Ito. He 
agreed with Collins that creating a dichotomy between the productivity 
growth and accumulation views was misleading. The more important 
question, suggested Page, is how these economies performed so well on 
both fronts and how they were able to generate and sustain such high 
rates of accumulation of physical and human capital without the effi- 
ciency losses observed in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe. Page also agreed with Collins that it is important to address the 
political economy issue of policy implementation and to understand the 
particular institutions that might explain the success of the macro- 
economic managers and bureaucracies in these countries. 
Page clarified the distinction made in the paper between industrial 
policy and export promotion. According to the export promotion view, 
the actual process of exporting is special, rather than the goods that are 
produced. Under the industrial policy view, however, it is the particular 
goods and industries that are important. Page agreed that it is often 
difficult to disentangle the effects of the two stories, especially since the 
criteria for success of industrial policies often seems to be related to 
export performance. While Page felt that the results of the paper and 
other more micro-oriented studies support the export-promotion story, 
he noted that more case-study evidence was needed before reaching 
stronger conclusions. Page also suggested that one way to interpret 
industrial policy in Japan and Korea was as a response to coordination 
failures or market imperfections. He noted that this would make it more 
difficult to determine whether industrial policy was successful since 
such a policy would appear market-conforming, ex post. 
Olivier Blanchard questioned the use of the high-income country 
elasticity for the computation of TFP growth. The standard approach is 
either to use capital's share of income as the elasticity or to estimate the 
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elasticity. Page responded that data on capital income shares were not 
available. In estimating the elasticities, the issue is how to separate the 
effect of TFP growth from the effects of allocative inefficiencies. For a 
subset of developing countries in the sample, output growth was 
negative, while factor accumulation was positive, suggesting severe 
resource allocation problems that would introduce noise in the produc- 
tion function estimates. Therefore, the elasticities were computed from 
the high-income countries since they were the least likely to suffer 
these allocation inefficiencies. 
Herschel Grossman commented that an important prior question is 
whether initial conditions allowed particular countries to achieve high- 
growth rates. If certain growth rates are economically infeasible given 
the available resources, then the political economy issue of how institu- 
tions foster growth is a secondary issue. Page responded that the initial 
conditions that are imposed by the data are presumably affected by 
prior public policy actions, which is why understanding the evolution 
of institutions is important. He added that the historical record on 
identifying necessary conditions for growth and predicting growth 
rates was poor. For example, in the late 1950s the USAID identified 
Burma and the Philippines as the growth poles for East Asia and wrote 
that the most serious impediment to South Korea's economic develop- 
ment was its bureaucracy. 
Andrew Atkeson asked whether it was exports or trade more gener- 
ally that was connected to growth. He noted that factor proportions 
theory would suggest that by opening up to trade, the economy could 
buy more capital services or intermediate inputs. This might be related 
to the sequencing theory advanced by Ito, if factor proportion differ- 
ences were viewed as the reason that the economy moved from indus- 
try to industry. Page answered that the high trade to GNP ratios for the 
HPAEs were not achieved by incentive-neutral policies, but rather by 
highly selective promotion of exports and admission of imports. He 
added that there was evidence from the micro literature that firms 
competing with imports and firms that compete on the export market 
but within the same industry have different learning effects. 
John Cochrane commented that important variables in the regres- 
sions such as , vings, education, and growth, were endogenous, and 
questioned whether any causal statements could be made. Cochrane 
interpreted the experience from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
as evidence that an exogenously high savings rate doesn't cause growth, 
suggesting that the observed positive correlation between savings and 
growth should be interpreted as the result of countries saving because 
they know that their growth prospects are good. 

